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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
As the first definition, World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
(1987) report, Our Common Future, defined sustainable development as ―a development 
which satisfies the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to satisfy their own necessities‖. In fact, this definition converts the essence of classical 
development from the slogan of ―more is better‖ to ―sufficient is better‖ (Joseph, 2001). 
Restriction of above definition to ―meet the needs‖ and ―make it sustainable‖ has raised 
disagreements. As Marcuse (1998) believes, sustainability in above definition cannot be a 
good goal. Sustainability as a goal only benefits those who have everything that they want.  
Although Agenda 21 clarified sustainable development by its three explicit pillars (Kahn, 
1995), i.e. social, economic and environmental, focus of researchers on economic and 
environmental pillars, i.e. ecologically sustainable development, led others to conclude 
sustainability can work just as a constraint on the achievement of other goals. Indeed, they 
believed that even focusing on environmental concerns, ―the problem for the world‘s poor is 
not that their condition cannot be sustained, but that they should not be sustained‖ (Marcuse, 
1998). 
 Historically, the approach to sustainable development has tended to be sectoral. 
Illustrating three pillars in a sectoral context emerged the tripartite model of sustainability 
often represented diagrammatically by three intersecting circles depicting the natural, social 
and economic dimensions (Figure 1.1-A) (Stimson et al., 2006). The intersecting areas are in 
fact, areas where related capitals are exchanged and converted by societal values, principles, 
customs, laws and rules (Elkington, 1997). This tripartite model, however, presents conceptual 
difficulties on how to integrate the three dimensions of sustainability and create mechanisms 
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that allow trade-offs over the use of social, economic and environmental resources. 
Three decade working on the concept and components of sustainable development paved 
the way to a better understanding. First, researchers have concluded that it is probably not 
possible or even desirable to arrive at one standard definition of sustainability. Such a dynamic 
concept must evolve and be refined as our experience and understanding develop (Moldan and 
Dahl, 2007; Shearman, 1990; Davies, 1997). Second, a fourth institutional pillar was added by 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (Karlsson et al., 2007; Söderbaum, 
2007). Institutions have been described as essential to sustainable development because of 
their indispensable role in implementing social, economic and environmental objectives. 
Although some claimed this dimension is embedded in social pillar, some researchers believe 
that it is better to define it as a distinct pillar to avoid complexity and make room to describe 
its trade-offs with other pillars (Spangenberg, 2007). Third, they found four pillars of 
sustainability must be integrated and interlinked in a comprehensive manner (Basiago, 1999). 
If we consider sustainable development as a trade-off between pillars‘ values, then it is 
conceptually possible to plot these values on axes to create rectangular plane of sustainability 
(Figure 1.1-B). Indeed, sustainable development that aims to restore equilibrium between 
institutional, environmental, economic and social values leads us to square diagrams when 
discrimination between pillars, i.e. non-sustainability, can be shown by rectangles or 
trapezoids (Stimson, 2007). 
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Fig. 1.1: Traditional model of sustainability (A) versus recent framework for sustainable 
development (B) 
 
This thesis is studying the sustainability of a public policy in energy sector using the above 
concept of sustainable development. In fact, it investigates the probable impact of energy 
subsidy reform on some selected variables in economic, social, and environmental pillars in 
Iran. Then, it answers to this question that the reform policy can address the sustainability 
targets in Iran or not. In the next sections, we will explain why a reform in the energy sector of 
Iranian economy is necessary.  
  
1.2 Energy subsidy in Iran and necessity of reform 
Iran is a country in Central Eurasia and Western Asia with a population of over 74 million 
(SCI, 2010). It is a country of particular geostrategic significance because of its location in the 
Middle East and Central Eurasia. In addition, it is the eighteenth largest country in the world, 
with an area of 1,648,000 km2 (SCI, 2010). 
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Although oil and gas production has accounted for an increasingly smaller share of real 
GDP, oil and gas revenues remain the main source of foreign exchange earnings and fiscal 
revenues. The share of oil in real GDP fell from an average of 40 percent of real GDP in the 
1960s to about 10.5 percent in the last decade, reflecting average annual non-oil GDP growth 
rate of 5.7 percent compared to only 4.4 percent for oil and gas GDP. Oil and gas receipts 
accounted for about 72 percent of export revenues in the last decade, despite rapid non-oil 
export growth. Oil and gas revenues also account for 65 percent of fiscal revenues, and are 
likely to remain the main source of financing for development projects in the foreseeable 
future notwithstanding recent efforts to diversify fiscal revenues (Guillaume and Zytek, 2010; 
Guillaume et al., 2011; IMF, 2011) 
Table 1.1 illustrates the energy balance of Iran in 2008. From the balance, Iran could 
produce 2428.4 MBOE of different types of energy, mainly petroleum and refined petroleum 
products (66%) and natural gas (33%). Near to 44% of total produced energy was exported, as 
the main source of fiscal revenue, and the remainder was consumed domestically. The main 
energy consumers in Iran were residential, public, and commercial sectors, transportation 
sector, and industrial sector that accounted for 37%, 25%, and 23% of total energy demand. 
Following the production pattern, the main consumed energy carriers were fossil fuels. 
Petroleum products and natural gas accounted for 47.9% and 42.6% of total energy 
consumption, respectively. The share of electricity consumption was only 8.6%.    
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Table 1.1 
Energy balance of Iran in 2008 (Million Barrel Oil Equivalent) 
Description 
Petroleum 
and refined 
petroleum 
products 
Natural 
gas Coke 
Renewable 
energies 
(solid 
biomass and 
biogas) 
Hydrop
ower 
Solar and 
wind 
energies 
Total 
electricity 
Total 
energy 
Production 1606.6 805.3 7.8 5.6 2.9 0.1 - 2428.4 
Import 84.3 44.5 3.7 - - - 1.0 133.5 
Export -1029.8 -29.7 -0.2 - - - -2.3 -1062.0 
Energy consumption 
in energy sectors and 
energy losses 
-127.7 
 
-344.9 
 
-8.4 
 
0.0 
 
-2.9 
 
-0.1 
 
97.9 
 -386.2  
Total energy supply 533.5 475.2 2.9 5.6 0 0 96.6 1113.8 
Residential, public 
and commercial 
sectors 
82.8 277.1 0.1 5.6 - - 49.4 415.0 
Industrial sector 73.0 147.3 0.3 - - - 32.2 252.8 
Transportation sector 269.8 11.6 - - - - 0.1 281.6 
Agricultural sector 27.9 1.5 - - - - 12.5 41.9 
Other sectors - - - - - - 2.4 2.4 
Non-energy 
utilization 79.9 37.7 2.5 - - - - 120.1 
Total energy 
demand 533.5 475.2 2.9 5.6 0 0 96.6 1113.8 
 
Fig. 1.2 and 1.3 show the trend of fossil fuels and electricity consumption in Iran over the 
period 1973‒2008. Despite a temporary decline in consumption of gas oil, fuel oil, and 
kerosene at the end of 1990s, the consumption of all types of fuels have increased enormously 
over the last decades. In the years after the Revolution (1979), the consumption of gas oil, fuel 
oil, gasoline, kerosene, LPG, natural gas, and electricity have grown annually 4.17%, 5.07%, 
5.48%, 1.06%, 3.48%, 9.24%, and 8.54%, respectively. Fig. 1.4 compares the growth rates of 
GDP, final energy consumption, and population in Iran over the period 1968‒2008. Almost, 
the growth rate of final energy consumption has been greater than the growth rates of GDP 
and population. It reflects the low share of energy expenditure in total spending of households 
and cost of producers due to low energy prices.   
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Fig. 1.2. Trend of total gas oil, fuel oil, gasoline, kerosene, and electricity consumption 
(1973-2008) 
 
 
Fig. 1.3. Trend of total natural gas consumption (1973-2008) 
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Fig. 1.4. Comparison of GDP, final energy consumption, and population growth rates in 
Iran (1968-2008) 
As it is obvious in Fig. 1.5, the consumption pattern of some sectors has changed 
essentially since 1970. Although the predominant fuels in transportation sector are still refined 
petroleum products, electricity and natural gas have substituted with petroleum products in 
residential, public, and commercial sector, industrial sector, and agricultural sector. Iran has 
the second largest natural gas reservoirs in the world and invested hugely to increase its 
production. In addition, it followed an ambitious and prolonged plan to expand the domestic 
natural gas pipelines, especially because it is a clean fuel and substitutable to petroleum, which 
can be exported more easily. While the extraction of natural gas started in 1972, it accounted 
for 66.38%, 58.29%, 4.12% and 3.52% of total energy consumption in residential, public, and 
commercial sector, industrial sector, transportation sector, and agricultural sector respectively 
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in 2008. As well, electricity accounted for 12.42%, 12.73%, 0.05% and 29.47% in the 
respective sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.5. Composition of sectoral energy consumption by fuel type in Iran at selected years 
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Fig. 1.6 shows the trend of energy intensity (energy consumption/GDP) in Iran as a whole 
and by fuel over the period 1973-2007. The graph illustrates when total energy intensity was 
0.66 BOE/Million IR. Rials in 1973, it increased extremely to 2.18 after three decades. The 
main contributor is undoubtedly natural gas which accounted for 69% of total energy intensity 
in 2007. Due to the low price of natural gas (1.03 cents/m3), the energy intensity of natural gas 
increased from 0.42 BOE/Million IR in 1973 to 1.51 in 2007, that shows an averagely 6.23% 
growth rate per year.       
 
 
Fig. 1.6. Trend of energy intensity by fuel type in Iran (1973-2007) 
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kerosene, electricity, and fuel oil were increased 10.6%, 11.1%, 9.2%, 5.1%, 5.1%, 7.5%, and 
6.6%, respectively. However, deduction of annual inflation rate from the nominal price growth 
rate makes an inverse picture. In the same period, real prices were growing -3.6%, -3.1%, 
-4.7%, -8.3%, -8.3%, -6.3% and -7.1% respectively, that evidence the energy prices got 
cheaper relatively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MoE (2010) 
Fig. 1.7. Nominal energy prices in Iran (1991‒2008) 
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Source: MoE (2010) 
Fig. 1.8. Real energy prices in Iran (1991‒2008) 
IEA (1999) defines an energy subsidy as any government action that concerns primarily the 
energy sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy 
producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers. Table 1.2 shows an approximate of 
energy subsidy in Iran by sector and energy type in 2008. All the figures are calculated by 
taking the gap between the domestic and global prices, adding all of direct financial payments 
which reduce the final prices for consumers. Table 1.2 indicates that all types of subsidies in 
energy sector were totally near to 442,033 billion IR. Rials (44.5 billion USD), or 6,002 
thousand IR. Rials per person (605 USD) in 2008. Among the consumers, transportation sector 
accounted for 40.2% of total energy subsidies. The next most significant consumers were 
residential and industrial sectors that accounted for 25.2% and 17.8% of total energy subsidies, 
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perspective, most of subsidies are paid for gas oil (27.3%), and then electricity and gasoline 
fuels (26.2% and 18.2% respectively). The least amount of subsidies was paid for LPG which 
has the smallest share in total energy consumption. Total amount of energy subsidies is equal 
to about 11% of GDP at 2009.  
 
Table 1.2 
Energy subsidy in Iran at 2009 (Billion IR Rials) 
Sector Residence Industry Agriculture Transport Commerce Public Total % 
% of 
GDP 
Gasoline - 285.8 124.8 79914.6 2.4 235.7 80563.3 18.2 0.020 
Kerosene 319 239.5 - 80.7 252.1 26364.5 27255.7 6.2 0.007 
Gas oil 2724.8 12809.9 18649.3 80214.6 1915.1 4486.6 120800.3 27.3 0.030 
Fuel oil - 23505.7 - 12837.8 3841.1 791.2 40975.7 9.3 0.010 
LPG 9619.4 1232 - 2421.2 - - 13272.7 3 0.003 
Electricity 47596 27321 15006 134.3 8673.3 17044.5 115775.5 26.2 0.028 
Natural 
gas 
25173.9 13411.3 209.9 2100.8 1448.6 1045.3 43389.7 9.8 0.011 
Total 111478.6 78817.9 34071.2 177623.2 16119.9 23922.2 442033 100 0.108 
% 25.2 17.8 7.7 40.2 3.6 5.4 100 - - 
% of GDP 0.027 0.019 0.008 0.044 0.004 0.006 0.108 - - 
Source: MoE (2010) and author calculation - 1 USD = 9,917 Rials 
 
1.3 Energy subsidy reform in Iran 
The Iranian targeted subsidy plan also known as the subsidy reform plan was passed by 
the Iranian Parliament on January 5, 2010. 1 The government has described the subsidy plan 
as the biggest surgery to the nation's economy in half a century and one of the most important 
                                                   
1 The Reform Act is available in Appendix 1. 
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undertakings in Iran's recent economic history. The goal of the subsidy reform plan is to 
replace subsidies on food and energy (80% of total) with targeted social assistance, in 
accordance with Five Year Economic Development Plan and move towards free market prices 
in a 5-year period. The subsidy reform plan is the most important part of a broader Iranian 
economic reform plan (Guillaume and Zytek, 2010). 
According to the government, approximately $100 billion per year is spent on subsidizing 
energy prices ($45 billion for the prices of fuel alone) and many consumable goods including 
bread, sugar, rice, cooking oil and medicine. However, some experts believe direct subsidies 
are about $30 billion, depending on oil prices. 
The subsidy system has been inherited from the Iran-Iraq war era but was never 
abolished. Iran is one of the largest gasoline consumers in the world, ranking second behind 
the United States in consumption per car. The government subsidy reform has been years in 
the making for various reasons. Iran's Supreme Leader has backed the government's latest 
subsidy reform plan. 
Iran was the largest provider of fuel subsidies in the world by 2009. Many Iranian experts 
agree that these unsustainable subsidies encourage waste among goods, including in the 
production sector, ranging from gasoline to bread that must be stopped and the only way to do 
that is to redirect subsidies. 
The stated goal of the subsidy reform is to rejuvenate Iran's economy, increase 
productivity, give it a new footing and bring it out of the slump it has been in for so long. 
Concretely, the government plans to replace the subsidies with targeted social assistance. 
Consequences of the economic reform plan are that Iran will be less vulnerable to US 
sanctions because it will reduce fuel imports. The reform plan will also save money for the 
Iranian people because it will end a multi-billion dollar-a-year contraband (17% percent of 
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fuel production in Iran is smuggled abroad daily). Due to subsidies, Iran had long had one of 
the cheapest gas prices in the world, 10 cents per liter or 40 cents per gallon (Guillaume and 
Zytek, 2010). 
Implementation of the plan will reduce waste and consumerism. In fact, according to 
official data, the higher income strata of the population has enjoyed the same subsidies as the 
poor until now. On the other side, subsidies reduction will reduce air pollution by reducing car 
traffic in Tehran. Finally, the subsidy plan will increase social justice through targeted social 
assistance. According to official data, the richest decile of households benefits 12 times more 
from gasoline subsidies than the poorest decile. Overall, implementation of the plan will 
increase productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness of Iran's economy, economic growth, oil 
exports and per capita income (all other things being equal). 
For implementation of the bill, an entity has been established as a duly authorized 
governmental company under the name ―Targeting Subsidies Organization‖. The amount 
saved by the government, will be distributed as follows: 50% towards the poorest strata of 
Iranian society; 20% at the government's disposal (to compensate for increased costs or as 
safety net); and the remaining 30% will be directed towards improving the efficiency of the 
utility, fuel and energy production infrastructure, public transportation development, industry 
and farming. 
The plan will commence with energy, fuel and utilities in the first year and consumable 
goods will start in the second year. The start of the cuts will coincide with the beginning of the 
second half of the Iranian year on Sept. 23, 2010. At that time, the 2007 Gas rationing plan 
will come to an end. 
In March 2010, the Iranian Parliament approved a $347 billion budget, in which the 
allocation from subsidies and the oil price were set at $20 billion and $65 per barrel, 
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respectively. According to the Vice President for Parliamentary Affairs, Iran's subsidy reforms 
would save 20 percent of the country's budget. Iran wants to save up to $100 billion on 
subsidies within three to four years. In 2011, the Iranian parliament approved a $508 billion 
budget based on $80/barrel oil price. This bill also factors in $54 billion from price hikes and 
subsidy cuts. 
According to the IMF, until recently a four-member Iranian household received an 
average of $4,000 a year in subsidies for oil and natural gas, compared with a typical annual 
income of about $3,600 a year. In 2010, Iran's Department of Statistics announced that 10 
million Iranians live under the absolute poverty line and 30 million live under the relative 
poverty line. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says implementation of the targeted subsidy 
system will eradicate unemployment and poverty in Iran within three years (Guillaume and 
Zytek, 2010). 
1.4 Main questions and objectives 
Current thesis studies the sustainability of energy subsidies reform in Iran. Studying 
different impacts of energy subsidy reform on some selected variables in economic, social, 
and environmental pillars, we are trying to assess the sustainability of this policy in Iran. 
Therefore, the main questions of the research are: 
1. What is the impact of energy subsidies reform on producer costs and inflation rate in Iran? 
2. How much the reform increases the expenditures and reduces the real income of Iranian 
households? 
3. Can the price reform reduce energy consumption and CO2 emission in Iran? 
4. Considering the answers of the above questions, is the energy subsidies reform a sustainable 
policy?  
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The main objectives of the research are as follow: 
1. Evaluating the sustainability of energy subsidies reform policy in Iran 
2. Proposing effective policies to improve the reform 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters, illustrated in Fig. 1.9. In Chapter 2, the sustainability 
of Iran is assessed in a comparative manner. In Chapter 3, the energy intensity of nonenergy 
sectors are derived and the potentials for reduction in energy consumption are examined. In 
Chapter 4, the inflationary impact of energy subsidy reform on producers and households are 
estimated. In Chapter 5, the probable energy conservation and CO2 mitigation of the reform 
are studied. In the last chapter, the analysis is concluded and some further studies are 
proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.9. The structure of thesis 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 5: 
The impact of energy 
subsidy reform on 
energy conservation 
and CO2 mitigation 
Chapter 4: 
The impact of energy 
subsidy reform on 
producer costs and 
household 
expenditure in Iran 
Chapter 3: 
Sectoral contribution 
in energy 
consumption and 
CO2 emissions: 
potentials for 
conservation 
Chapter 2: 
Sustainability 
assessment of Iran: 
A global 
comparative study 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
Sustainability assessment of Iran: A global 
comparative study 
  
19 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987) report, Our 
Common Future, provided the first definition of sustainable development as ―a development 
which satisfies the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to satisfy their own necessities‖. Agenda 21, revealed at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in 1992, clearly identified three key building 
blocks of sustainable development: economic, environmental and social pillars. However, the 
restriction to ‗meet the human needs‘ and ‗make it sustainable‘ has raised some disagreements 
(Marcuse, 1998). Three decades of debate on the concept and components of sustainable 
development have paved the way to a better understanding of the issues. 
First, researchers have concluded that it is probably not possible or even desirable to arrive 
at one standard definition of sustainability. Such a dynamic concept must evolve and be 
refined as our experience and understanding develop (Shearman, 1990; Davies, 1997; Mog, 
2004; Moldan and Dahl, 2007). Second, a fourth institutional pillar was added by the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (Karlsson et al., 2007; Söderbaum, 2007). 
Institutions have been described as essential to sustainable development because of their 
indispensable role in implementing social, economic and environmental objectives. Although 
some claimed this dimension is embedded in social pillars, some researchers believe that it is 
better to define it as a distinct pillar to avoid complexity and make room to describe its 
trade-offs with other pillars (Spangenberg, 2007). Third, researchers have found that the four 
pillars of sustainability must be integrated and interlinked in a comprehensive manner 
(Basiago, 1999). 
Since the Earth Summit, authorities at different spatial levels have committed to 
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implementing sustainability measures (ICLEI, 2002; Fernández-Sánchez and 
Rodríguez-López, 2010). Sustainable development indicators (SDIs) are used to collect, 
process and use information with the goal of making better decisions, directing smarter policy 
choices, measuring progress and monitoring feedback mechanisms in all of the sustainability 
pillars, as emphasized in Agenda 21. SDIs as an interaction between values and objectives, 
policy and science (Shields et al., 2002; Rametsteiner et al., 2009) increase the accuracy of 
evaluating/quantifying the diverse sustainability issues in different temporal (short, medium or 
long run) and spatial (international, national, regional, urban or local) dimensions 
(Spangenberg et al., 2002; Ramos and Caeiro, 2010). 
The first step in making any public policy with the target of sustainable development is 
studying the current performance of the countries in each pillars of sustainable development. 
While there are continuous opportunities to improve the sustainability in each country, the 
sustainability assessment of countries should be carried out in a comparative basis. If we 
understand the relative performance of a specific country (such as Iran), we can easily find the 
rooms for the further improvements. In addition, we can get a list of priorities by assessing the 
pillar gaps exist between each country and the best performer. 
In this chapter, we are going to make the same study for Iran. Therefore, as a first step, 
sustainability pillar variables for 131 countries are defined and derived for the period 2000–
2007. In the next step, the comparative performance of Iran is investigated. 
 
2.2 Sustainability indicators for intercountry comparison 
As McGlade (2007) believes, the main purpose of SDIs is to provide a comprehensive and 
highly scalable information-driven architecture that is policy relevant and understandable to 
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members of society and can help them understand previous trends, current situations and 
future outlooks. In other words, SDIs based on their communication power, help different 
layers of society, from governors to the general population, to decide on what to do. To meet 
this target, indicators should be purposeful, measurable, representative, reliable and 
communicable (Bauler et al., 2007). 
One of the main applications of SDIs is to measure and compare the sustainability of 
countries. It is recognized that SDIs need to be applicable over a variety of spatial scales and 
conditions to support global as well as local comparisons (Rees et al., 2008). Comparisons 
help to determine what does and what does not work and why. Karlsson et al. (2007) state that 
approaches to developing indicators suitable for intercountry comparisons should strive to: 
 develop a sound, simple and unified method for the selected indicators, 
 select indicators that reflect commonly agreed aspects of sustainable development 
or commonly agreed targets for action, 
 avoid indicators that are highly influenced by diversity in natural, socioeconomic 
and cultural circumstances, 
 have full transparency of the whole process (development of indicators, methods, 
data collection and presentation), 
 obtain agreement among the partners involved in the process, including public 
availability of results, 
 be complementary to other indicator sets developed according to local, national or 
regional priorities. 
One problem in the establishment of intercountry SDIs is deciding between weak versus 
strong sustainability assessment. Weak sustainability assumes perfect substitutability between 
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produced and natural capital, whereas strong sustainability assumes no substitutability. The 
argument of weak and strong sustainability is sometimes seen as a discussion between 
neoclassical environmental economics and ecological economics. Where the former believes 
that the equilibrium quantity of pollution or extraction is not necessarily zero (based on 
equality between marginal rates of benefit and costs of pollution emissions or natural resource 
extraction), the latter believes that some services of nature cannot be replaced by man-made 
capital or human labor (Ayres, 2007; Shmelev and Rodríguez-Labajos, 2009). It seems that for 
intercountry comparisons, weak SDIs have more capacity to satisfy the Karlsson criteria 
(especially obtaining agreement of countries), because for the poor but resource-rich countries, 
natural resources are the only asset at least for the current time. Therefore, we use weak SDIs 
in this study. 
Different organizations, institutions, universities and NGOs are publishing their SDIs to 
show macro sustainability trends and rank countries. UNDP (2003) detailed the sources of 
various published governance indicators for different geographical coverage. Böhringer and 
Jochem (2007) reviewed the explanatory power of 11 sustainability indices applied in policy 
practice. They concluded that the indices fail to fulfill fundamental scientific requirements 
making them rather useless if not misleading with respect to policy advice. Singh et al. (2009) 
provided an overview of 70 sustainability indices focusing on their formulation strategy, 
scaling, normalization, weighting and aggregation methodology. Some authors also tried to 
produce their own indicators. For instance, Udo and Jansson (2009) tried to use several human 
survival, development and progress variables to create aggregate sustainable development 
parameters that describe the social, environmental and technological sustainability capacities 
of 132 nations and rank them. Chen et al. (2009) used data envelopment analysis (DEA) to 
carry out comparison of BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN states 
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and Mexico) and G7 members‘ overall performances. Raab and Feroz (2007) also used DEA 
to develop a generalized efficiency index for a set of 57 national governments, both of 
developing and developed countries, by employing four components of gross national product 
and five resource-availability indicators. 
 
2.3 Principal component analysis 
A vast domain of approaches, from bivariate to multivariate techniques, can be used to 
construct sustainability indicators. Whereas bivariate analysis measures the strength of the 
association between all pairs of variables, multivariate analysis assesses the overall power of 
any collection of variables to measure any other variable (Singh et al., 2009). The power of 
multivariate techniques in addition to the complexity of the concept and elements of the 
sustainability, inevitably dominated these methods and their indicators, i.e., composite 
indicators. Table 2.1 summarizes some of multivariate analytical techniques and their 
applications. 
 
Table 2.1  
Summary of some multivariate techniques and their applications. 
Type Technique Purpose Application 
Classification 
Cluster analysis 
Exploratory and 
confirmatory 
Classification of objects into groups 
displaying similar properties 
Discriminant analysis 
Explanatory 
and predictive 
Determine variables responsible for 
segregation of objects into groups 
Correspondence analysis 
Descriptive and 
exploratory 
Analyze discrete variables with many 
categories and to group relevant 
information 
Data envelopment 
analysis 
Explanatory 
Evaluate efficiency of objects and 
ordering of them 
Summary Principal components 
analysis/empirical 
orthogonal functions 
Exploratory and 
data reduction 
Identify sources of variation in 
multivariate data 
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Factor analysis Explanatory 
Determine underlying factors responsible 
for variations 
Cronbach coefficient 
alpha 
Explanatory 
Investigate the degree of the correlations 
between a set of variables 
Canonical correlation 
analysis (CCA) 
Explanatory 
Investigate the relationship between two 
groups of variables 
Self-organizing maps Predictive 
Identify commonly encountered scenarios 
or patterns within spatial data sets 
Spatial 
relationship 
analysis 
Semivariogram 
Assessment and 
predictive 
Understanding spatial relationships 
between measurements. Interpolate 
between samples 
Geographically 
weighted regression 
Exploratory and 
predictive 
Understand changes in relationships 
between variables in space 
Adapted from Bierman et al. (2009) and OECD (2008). 
 
PCA is one of the most popular methods among multivariate techniques to construct SDIs. 
The central idea of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large 
number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation present 
in the data set. This is achieved by transforming it into a new set of variables, the PCs, which 
are uncorrelated and ordered so that the first few retain most of the variation present in all of 
the original variables. In summary, it can be said that PCA is a variable reduction technique 
that can be used when variables are highly correlated; it reduces the number of observed 
variables to a smaller number of PCs that account for most of the variation of the observed 
variables and is a large sample procedure (Jolliffe, 2002). These characteristics are the reasons 
why researchers use PCA to construct their SDIs. 
Different sustainability indices can be constructed using PCA. These composite indicators 
include the Internal Market Index, Business Climate Indicator, General Indicator of Science 
and Technology, City Development Index and Environment Performance Index (Singh et. al., 
2009). Jollands et al. (2004) applied PCA to derive eco-efficiency indices for New Zealand. 
Adler et al. (2009) combined PCA and DEA to design a framework to measure the relative 
socioeconomic performance of developing countries. Finally, Lai (2003) used PCA to measure 
and analyze the progress of human development in Chinese provinces since 1990. He also 
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compared his scores with Human Development Index (HDI) scores. 
 
2.4 Designing the model 
OECD (2008) clarifies the methodology of composite indicator construction by defining 
ten steps: theoretical framework, data selection, imputation of missing data, choosing 
multivariate analysis, normalization, weighting and aggregation, uncertainty and sensitivity 
analysis, back to the data, links to other indicators and visualization of the results. Following 
the theoretical framework explained in Section 2.2, 29 variables were selected. Data are 
arranged in the same ordering to create the input matrix for PCA. In the next step, the data 
matrix is normalized based on three methods to study the sensitivity of the normalization 
methods. Using PCA, eigenvalues, factor loadings and PCs are derived. Finally, the PCs are 
used to construct SDIs for each country for each year. These steps will be explained in more 
detail in the following sections. 
 
2.4.1. Data 
Originally, we used UN reports (UN, 2001a, 2001b) to classify and choose the variables. 
However, some important points should be considered before discussing the variables. First, in 
most similar studies, there is a severe trade-off between the length of the sample period and 
the number of countries. A longer period generally means having to omit some countries 
because of data unavailability. For greater spatial coverage (especially in institutional and 
social pillars), authors inevitably decide to use short sample periods. Second, as mentioned in 
Section 2.2, it seems that weak sustainability is more plausible than strong sustainability for 
intercountry comparisons. Therefore, based on data availability, five environmental variables 
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are chosen by using their adjusted saving measures. The share of adjusted savings in gross 
national income (GNI) is an interesting weak sustainability measure that enables us to 
consider both pollution damages or natural resource depletion and their converted capitals 
such as human capital in monetary terms. Third, interesting pillars could be introduced to 
account for interactions between pillars that are neglected in the current study to avoid more 
complexity. Consequently, some variables could be found that have two pillar dimensions, e.g., 
the improved water source variable. Regarding water pollution, the variable is an 
environmental sustainability issue, but as access of population to improved water is a health 
concern, water pollution has to be located in the social sustainability pillar. Of course, 
isolation of pillars from each other is a weak point of this study that should be mentioned in 
future studies. 
Considering the above-mentioned points, 136 countries were selected for this research. 
During the process, five countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Estonia and Gabon) became outliers that were omitted from the list and the research was 
completed for 131 countries. The time span of the study is 2000 to 2007. Because of missing 
observations, data for 2008 were omitted. Table 2 lists the variables used to construct each 
pillar. 
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Table 2.2 
Variables of sustainable development pillars and their sources. 
Sustainability 
pillar 
Variable Scale Source 
Institutional 
sustainability 
1. Political rights 
Qualitative, 1–7, best to worst 
Freedom House: 
www.freedomhouse.org 2. Civil liberties 
3. Press freedom index Qualitative, from 0, best to 
worst 
Reporters Without 
Borders: www.rsf.org 
4. Voice and accountability 
Qualitative, (–2.5)–(2.5), 
worst to best 
Kaufmann et al. (2009), 
Governance Matters 
VIII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance 
Indicators (1996–2008), 
World Bank Policy 
Research 
5. Political stability & absence of 
violence/terrorism 
6. Government effectiveness 
7. Regulatory quality 
8. Rule of law 
9. Control of corruption 
Environmental 
sustainability 
10. Adjusted savings: carbon 
dioxide damage 
Quantitative, % of GNI 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2000–2007 reports) 
11. Adjusted savings: energy 
depletion 
12. Adjusted savings: mineral 
depletion 
13. Adjusted savings: net forest 
depletion 
14. Adjusted savings: particulate 
emission damage 
Economic 
sustainability 
15. GDP per capita Quantitative, PPP 
(constant 2005 international $) 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2000–2007 reports) 
16. GDP per capita growth Quantitative, annual % 
17. Inflation, consumer prices Quantitative, annual % 
18. Cost of business start-up 
procedures 
Quantitative, (% of GNI per 
capita) 
19. Current account balance Quantitative, % of GDP 
20. Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows 
Quantitative, % of GDP 
21. Internet users Quantitative, per 100 people 
Social 
sustainability 
22. GINI index Qualitative, %, best to worst 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(2000–2007 reports) 
23. Health expenditure, total Quantitative, % of GDP 
24. Improved water source Quantitative, % of population 
with access 
25. Life expectancy at birth, total Quantitative, years 
26. Mortality rate, under 5 years old Quantitative, per 1,000 
27. Proportion of seats held by 
women in national parliaments 
Quantitative, % 
28. Public spending on education, 
total 
Quantitative, % of GDP 
29. Ratio of girls to boys in primary 
and secondary education 
Quantitative, % 
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2.4.2. Normalization 
The PCA methodology is well documented (Manly, 1994; Sharma, 1996; Jolliffe, 2002) 
and consists of seven steps: construct a data matrix, standardize variables, calculate the 
correlation matrix, find eigenvalues (to rank PCs) and eigenvectors, select PCs (based on 
stopping rules), interpret the results and calculate scores. The variables in Table 2.2 are of 
different types (quantitative and qualitative), units (number, percentage etc.), and ordering 
(ascending and descending). To manipulate the data for further PCA analysis, data should be 
modified in two steps. In the first step, data should be rearranged in the same ordering to 
facilitate the possibility of pillar aggregation and derive the total sustainable indicator for each 
country. Therefore, data in descending order (from best to worst) were multiplied by minus 
one to be converted into ascending manner (from worst to best). 
In the second step, three normalization methods, i.e., standardization, min–max and cyclical 
techniques are applied to remove the data units and allow the possibility of running sensitivity 
analysis by comparing the ranking of the countries derived from each normalization method. 
All normalization methods were calculated based on the performance of countries in the initial 
time period, t0, to assess their performance across years. Using this method, the final PCs of 
countries can be compared over time. 
For each variable, z-scores were calculated based on the following normalization formula: 
0
0
tt
q ct
q t
c
x x
I


 ,                                         (2.1) 
where tqI  is the normalized score for country q, 0
t
cx  is the variable average across countries 
for the reference year (here 2000) and 0tc  is the standard deviation across countries for the 
reference year. The min–max method is applied based on equation 2.2. 
29 
 
0
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max ( ) min ( )
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q ct
q t t
c c
x x
I
x x


                                    
 (2.2) 
0max ( )tc x  and 0min ( )
t
c x  are the minimum and maximum values of variable x across all 
countries in the reference year. When variables are in the form of time series, cyclical 
transformations can be made by subtracting the mean over time ( )tt qE x  and then dividing 
by the mean of the absolute values of the differences from the mean (equation 2.3). 
( )
( ( ) )
tt
q t qt
q tt
t q t q
x E x
I
E x E x



                                      
 (2.3) 
 
2.4.3. Ranking countries 
Normalization of raw data leads us to three input data sets. Different normalized input data 
allow researchers to test the robustness of the derived sustainability scores and ranking of 
countries. Deriving factor loadings from PCA, PCs can be calculated based on equation 2.4. 
Q×P Q×P P×PZ =X .A                                             
(2.4) 
Letting Q and P be the numbers of countries and variables, Q×PX  represents the 
normalized matrix of input data, P×PA  is the factor loading matrix and finally, Q×PZ  
represents P vectors of PCs for Q countries. The next step is to select the first PCs that 
preserve a ‗high‘ amount of the cumulative variance of the input data. There are different rules 
to define a ‗high‘ magnitude known as ―stopping rules‖ (OECD, 2008). Here, ‗variance 
explained criteria‘ are implemented based on the rule of keeping enough PCs to account for 
90% of the variation. 
Before finalizing the analysis, we need to track the PCs to identify outliers. An outlier is an 
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observation that lies an abnormal distance from other values in a random sample from a 
population. Outliers are deviating factor loadings and make the PCs biased. If outliers are 
found in the analysis, PCA should be repeated after omitting the outliers. In this way, five 
countries were omitted and the analysis was repeated. The final selected PCs based on 
stopping rules were aggregated across countries and used as the sustainability indicator. 
A comparison of rankings for three normalized input data reveals a high degree of 
similarity among them. Because of the 99% correlation between the three ranking matrices, 
we can take arithmetic mean of the inputs and repeat the ranking procedure. Table 2.3 
illustrates the ranking of countries based on the derived PCs of 131 countries that are grouped 
for two sequential years. A ranking for total sustainability was done after rescaling of scores 
from 0 to 100 representing the worst and best performances, respectively. This process was 
done to weight all pillars equally. 
To compare the accuracy of our PCA rankings, the average HDI ranking of countries is 
provided in the final column of Table 2.3. Before any comparisons, it should be mentioned 
that HDI consists of three (equally weighted) subindices that are aggregated by taking an 
arithmetic mean: Life Expectancy Index, Education Index (decomposed into an Adult Literacy 
Index and Gross Enrolment Ratio Index), and a GNP Index. In fact, HDI has a strong focus on 
the social dimension and no institutional or environmental variables can be found in it. 
Nevertheless, running a correlation test between our PCA and HDI rankings discloses a 
correlation of 87% between these two rankings. 
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Table 2.3 
Ranking of countries based on their institutional, environmental, economic and social 
sustainability among 131 countries (2000–2007). 
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1 Albania 64 16 71 52 41 46 49 49 47 67 Lebanon 90 80 94 58 78 90 67 72 54 
2 Algeria 107 88 46 59 73 82 87 74 70 68 Liberia 118 110 130 128 128 131 125 125 119 
3 Angola 112 125 128 131 131 130 131 123 97 69 Lithuania 26 22 27 38 25 23 27 27 34 
4 Argentina 50 111 50 48 52 65 55 43 35 70 Macedonia 58 33 53 45 47 42 39 37 48 
5 Armenia 79 122 37 74 99 81 75 68 59 71 Madagascar 56 12 108 120 80 88 85 93 99 
6 Australia 12 66 18 17 16 16 16 19 2 72 Malawi 73 26 116 57 68 60 65 56 113 
7 Austria 11 27 12 7 11 11 7 10 14 73 Malaysia 62 45 22 41 35 34 34 40 46 
8 Bangladesh 102 57 89 101 83 93 98 99 102 74 Mali 48 96 112 108 92 87 88 89 129 
9 Belgium 15 13 10 9 7 12 10 11 16 75 Mauritania 89 130 98 114 129 128 129 129 108 
10 Benin 44 44 114 102 62 62 70 77 112 76 Mexico 53 53 55 51 44 38 48 50 39 
11 Bhutan 94 78 76 77 101 84 68 58 92 77 Moldova 74 84 62 25 64 48 40 41 80 
12 Bolivia 61 117 100 69 77 73 91 91 76 78 Mongolia 43 129 65 49 104 64 100 100 79 
13 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
66 39 75 28 48 43 35 36 51 79 Morocco 85 17 70 55 49 55 52 55 90 
14 Brazil 45 60 54 72 51 51 50 45 50 80 Mozambique 63 34 103 115 91 85 79 84 122 
15 Bulgaria 46 116 47 39 60 50 42 51 42 81 Namibia 38 37 58 79 40 41 46 46 89 
16 Burkina Faso 97 92 113 98 106 103 102 109 126 82 Nepal 111 49 96 95 87 99 109 102 98 
17 Burundi 121 115 124 80 125 122 116 106 125 83 Netherlands 7 62 4 14 10 14 11 7 7 
18 Cambodia 99 18 111 112 97 104 101 104 94 84 New Zealand 5 8 21 12 13 8 9 13 18 
19 Cameroon 108 81 109 117 112 112 112 114 105 85 Nicaragua 57 21 118 67 56 58 59 65 85 
20 Canada 9 32 9 13 9 10 13 12 4 86 Niger 78 94 127 124 121 115 119 115 131 
21 
Central Afr. 
Rep. 
109 35 122 129 109 123 117 120 128 87 Nigeria 104 98 73 130 113 119 122 119 109 
22 Chad 116 101 121 125 116 125 124 130 123 88 Norway 8 38 1 4 2 4 4 3 1 
23 Chile 20 126 41 78 46 49 58 69 31 89 Oman 76 121 33 76 67 89 83 80 40 
24 China 127 112 32 93 111 108 110 108 66 90 Pakistan 123 104 85 104 114 113 115 118 96 
25 Colombia 91 46 61 63 58 69 61 60 55 91 Panama 39 20 63 65 37 37 37 38 43 
26 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
120 83 129 126 130 126 127 127 127 92 
Papua New 
Guinea 
67 131 91 127 126 129 130 131 100 
27 Costa Rica 29 25 59 44 31 29 33 32 38 93 Paraguay 75 65 106 73 69 71 76 67 68 
28 Côte d’Ivoire 122 43 117 106 95 109 111 116 114 94 Peru 59 113 57 103 72 79 89 98 57 
29 Croatia 37 55 36 24 32 33 31 31 33 95 Philippines 72 64 79 94 70 63 77 82 71 
30 Czech Rep. 24 24 28 23 24 22 21 20 27 96 Poland 32 56 38 31 29 28 30 30 30 
31 Denmark 4 10 7 1 3 2 2 1 13 97 Portugal 17 36 48 18 21 20 23 21 26 
32 
Dominican 
Rep. 
49 69 72 91 55 57 64 59 62 98 Romania 40 29 51 61 43 35 36 42 45 
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33 Ecuador 71 52 77 113 74 83 80 85 52 99 Russia 106 105 29 64 88 80 86 75 49 
34 Egypt 105 93 84 47 65 77 81 86 83 100 Rwanda 113 50 110 109 118 111 107 90 117 
35 El Salvador 47 28 90 84 53 52 57 57 72 101 Saudi Arabia 124 119 40 36 79 92 96 83 41 
36 Ethiopia 114 107 105 100 123 121 108 103 121 102 Senegal 52 87 107 89 89 72 73 78 116 
37 Finland 1 4 5 10 5 5 5 4 11 103 Sierra Leone 95 97 131 119 127 127 128 128 130 
38 France 18 2 23 8 14 13 14 14 9 104 Slovakia 25 11 25 35 27 24 22 22 32 
39 Gambia 88 71 120 111 96 96 105 117 118 105 Slovenia 21 19 24 16 18 17 17 17 24 
40 Georgia 84 95 60 60 85 74 60 63 63 106 South Africa 34 74 66 70 39 40 41 48 88 
41 Germany 13 6 16 11 12 9 12 8 20 107 South Korea 33 63 19 43 30 32 29 28 22 
42 Ghana 42 103 99 75 81 66 63 64 107 108 Spain 19 42 31 27 22 25 24 24 15 
43 Greece 31 79 43 34 33 31 32 33 21 109 Sri Lanka 81 40 82 88 59 59 72 87 69 
44 Guatemala 82 59 93 96 82 86 84 81 84 110 Sudan 130 67 87 122 115 120 120 122 104 
45 Guinea 110 114 119 118 124 118 121 124 120 111 Sweden 6 1 3 3 1 1 3 2 6 
46 
Guinea-Bissa
u 
96 86 126 116 110 117 113 121 124 112 Switzerland 3 9 6 6 4 6 6 5 8 
47 Guyana 51 128 104 40 71 78 92 110 77 113 Syria 126 102 86 62 108 107 106 111 73 
48 Haiti 119 51 125 123 122 124 126 113 103 114 Tajikistan 115 68 83 92 105 95 90 97 87 
49 Honduras 65 54 92 86 61 61 69 76 74 115 Tanzania 70 73 102 110 90 91 93 96 106 
50 Hungary 22 15 42 19 23 19 19 25 29 116 Thailand 55 58 45 71 38 39 54 71 60 
51 Iceland 2 3 13 2 6 3 1 6 3 117 Togo 101 77 123 87 107 100 97 107 111 
52 India 60 89 74 85 66 67 71 70 93 118 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
36 90 17 66 34 36 47 35 44 
53 Indonesia 86 106 88 105 100 105 103 88 75 119 Tunisia 98 47 69 33 54 54 51 53 67 
54 Iran 128 108 44 50 93 98 104 92 61 120 Turkey 69 91 67 68 84 68 56 61 53 
55 Ireland 10 5 20 30 15 18 18 16 5 121 Uganda 93 76 97 99 103 101 82 79 110 
56 Israel 35 61 39 15 26 30 28 29 23 122 Ukraine 83 100 34 29 86 56 43 34 58 
57 Italy 27 14 30 22 20 26 25 23 17 123 United Arab 
Emirates 
68 118 8 83 57 76 66 54 28 
58 Jamaica 41 72 56 56 45 45 45 47 65 124 
United 
Kingdom 
14 7 14 20 17 15 15 15 19 
59 Japan 23 41 15 21 19 21 20 18 10 125 United States 16 31 11 5 8 7 8 9 12 
60 Jordan 77 75 78 26 50 53 38 52 64 126 Uruguay 30 109 68 54 42 44 44 39 36 
61 Kazakhstan 103 123 35 82 102 102 95 95 56 127 Uzbekistan 131 127 64 42 119 116 118 105 81 
62 Kenya 87 30 95 90 94 75 74 66 101 128 Venezuela 92 70 49 97 63 97 78 73 86 
63 Kuwait 54 120 2 46 36 47 53 44 25 129 Vietnam 125 82 52 81 98 106 94 94 78 
64 Kyrgyzstan 100 48 81 53 75 70 62 62 82 130 Yemen 117 99 115 32 76 94 99 101 95 
65 Laos 129 85 80 107 120 114 114 112 91 131 Zambia 80 124 101 121 117 110 123 126 115 
66 Latvia 28 23 26 37 28 27 26 26 37 
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2.5 Dynamics of the countries’ sustainability 
Normalization of the raw data based on their reference year provides an opportunity to 
compare the derived indicators over time. In this part, certain findings from Table 2.3 will be 
explained, in particular the highest versus the lowest ranked countries, the greatest versus the 
least progress and total and regional sustainability trends. 
 
2.5.1. The highest versus the lowest ranked 
As can be seen from Table 2.3, the top 10 countries in terms of total sustainability are 
Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, the United States, Austria, Belgium 
and Germany. The Scandinavian countries are the most sustainable countries in terms of all 
pillars and their performances are stable during the period 2000–2007. The worst ranked 
countries are Papua New Guinea, Mauritania, Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Liberia, Chad, Guinea, Haiti and Sudan, which are mainly African countries. For the 
institutional pillar, the best performance belongs to Finland, Iceland and Switzerland. For the 
environmental pillar, Sweden, France and Iceland have the best performance. For the 
economic pillar, the best performance belongs to Norway, Kuwait and Sweden. In the last 
pillar, social sustainability, Denmark, Iceland and Sweden have the best performance among 
the 131 countries. 
 
2.5.2. The greatest versus the least progress 
The other interesting concern is the greatest and least progress. Institutionally, the highest 
progress from 2000 to 2007 belongs to Liberia, Bhutan and Ukraine. Liberia increased its rank 
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from 127 in 2000 to 90 in 2007. On the other hand, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Côte d‘Ivoire 
declined. For the environmental pillar, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan increased their 
ranks and the positions of Zambia, Papua New Guinea and Chile deteriorated. The 
performances of Angola, Congo and Argentina were remarkable for the economic pillar. For 
instance, Angola improved its economic conditions and increased its ranking from 129 in 2000 
to 59 in 2007. In contrast with these countries, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Yemen deteriorated. 
For the social pillar, Rwanda, Moldova and Burundi were the outstanding progress countries 
whereas Kuwait, Uzbekistan and Malaysia had the worst performances. Rwanda increased its 
social ranking from 121 to 72 while the performance of Kuwait decreased from 30 to 74. In 
total, the greatest progress was achieved by Angola, Ukraine and Bhutan whereas the greatest 
decline was experienced by Chad, Thailand and Guyana. 
 
2.5.3. Total sustainability trend 
Figure 2.1 shows total sustainability of countries in each sustainability pillar and Figure 2.2 
shows the gap between the best and worst countries‘ performances for the period 2000–2007. 
The institutional pillar reveals a stable trend for the period. Although the total score of the 
institutional pillar increased slightly, the gap between the top and bottom ranked countries 
remains constant. Improvement in the social and especially the economic pillars is also evident, 
but the gaps remain stable too. No matter how performance improves particularly for the 
economic dimension, the gap between rich and poor countries persists. Comparison of the 
sustainability for the two institutional and social pillars is also interesting. As previously 
mentioned, some believe that the institutional dimension is embedded in the social pillar. 
However, separating the institutional dimension shows that countries are strengthening more 
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in terms of their social progress, e.g., by supporting their education and health programs or 
removing obstacles to women‘s participation, instead of improving their institutional 
capacities. Unfortunately, good governance is not highlighted enough relative to other 
dimensions for governors and the public. 
Despite the optimistic trends in these pillars, environmental sustainability has demonstrated 
negative trends. We see in Fig. 2.2 that the both of environmental pillar curves are downward 
sloping, which indicates that in addition to total sustainability, the performance of all countries 
has deteriorated. If we consider the environmental and economic pillars to be two sides of a 
coin, we can interpret these trends. Economic growth has been the primary target and has 
played the most critical role among sustainability variables for policy makers in most counties. 
Figure 2.1 supports this claim that most decision and policy makers sacrifice environmental 
quality to attain economic targets. However, our findings in Section 2.6 will complete this 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Total trends of institutional, environmental, economic and social pillars 
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Fig. 2.2. Gaps between max and min scores in the sustainability pillars. 
 
 
2.5.4. Regional sustainability trend 
Figure 2.3 shows the trend in total sustainability for the studied countries based on their 
regional locations. Studying the trends across regions and the level of sustainability, i.e., level 
of PCs on the vertical axes, reveals many facts. In Africa, despite the increasing trend in the 
institutional, economic and social pillars, all countries have negative scores. In fact, Africa has 
the worst standing relative to other regions for these pillars. The only positive score belongs to 
the environmental pillar that is, however, declining rapidly. In Asia, only the economic pillar 
improved and the social and institutional dimensions have stable trends. This story repeats 
itself for Australia and Oceania. In Central America and the Caribbean, institutional and social 
pillars improved after 2005. Despite rapid economic progress in this region, environmental 
conditions deteriorated gradually. Regarding the level of sustainability, Europe is the best 
region in the world. While economic conditions improved in Europe, other institutional, 
environmental and social pillars had stable trends with a high level of sustainability. In the 
Middle East and North Africa, after frequent fluctuations, only the economic pillar improved 
while the other pillars deteriorated. Finally, the trends in North and South America were 
similar. Whereas the social and economic pillars showed an increasing trend, institutional and 
environmental sustainability declined. 
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2.6 Sustainable development in Iran 
The above findings pave my way to make a comparison between the sustainability of each 
pillar in Iran and in the other countries. Table 2.4 shows the normalized PC of each pillar in 
selected countries and the rank of the corresponding country across 131 countries. The 
selected countries are the countries with the best performance, the members of BRIC 
countries, Iran, and some of the neighboring countries of Iran.  
As it is clear, the lowest PC belongs to institutional pillars that put Iran at the end of the 
list of countries with good governance. While Finland has the best score in institutional pillar, 
i.e. 100, the score of Iran is only 5.63. The low quality of governance puts Iran beside the 
countries like China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The story is the same for the environmental 
development. While the global average of PCs is about 82.83 in environmental pillar, it is near 
to 71 for Iran, puts Iran 108th country in the global ranking. The scores in the economic and 
social pillars of sustainable development are more than the global average. However, there is a 
significant gap with the performance of Iran and the best countries. 
Table 2.4 
Comparison of sustainability in Iran and selected countries 
1. Country Institutional Environmental Economic Social 
Normal PC Rank Normal PC Rank Normal PC Rank Normal PC Rank 
Best performance Finland (100) 1 Sweden (100) 1 Norway (100) 1 Denmark (100) 1 
Brazil 57.12 45 89.33 60 67.23 54 46.90 72 
China 5.80 127 70.37 112 76.11 32 35.99 93 
India 48.67 60 80.13 89 63.64 74 40.43 85 
Russia 22.47 106 71.82 105 78.24 29 49.33 64 
Iran 5.63 128 70.88 108 71.09 44 56.78 50 
Kuwait 49.86 54 64.72 120 96.67 2 59.25 46 
Pakistan 13.38 123 72.46 104 60.77 85 31.48 104 
Saudi Arabia 13.09 124 64.92 119 72.42 40 64.36 36 
United Arab Em. 45.09 68 65.63 118 91.28 8 40.81 83 
Global average 49.11 ---- 82.83 ---- 64.78 ---- 49.49 ---- 
Note: Normal PC represents normalized principal component ranging from 0 to 100. 
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Fig. 2.4 represents the trend of sustainability in each pillar over the period 2000-2007. On 
the other hand, while the PCs are normalized, it shows the gap between the score of Iran and 
the best performances in the world. As it is clear, except the environmental pillar, 
sustainability remained unchanged or deteriorated. Totally, it can be concluded that the 
sustainability has reduced over the period of study.     
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Gaps between SDIs of Iran and the best performers 
 
The above analysis shows that the main challenge of Iranian society is its institutional 
development. The next would be social development that guarantees more balanced growth. 
The third and fourth are economic and environmental development. The above analysis can 
make a guideline for policymakers to set their targets and design their policies to address the 
main development gaps. Indeed, this guarantees the society to achieve more balanced 
development. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to assess the sustainable development of Iran in a comparative 
framework. As mentioned, PCA was applied to derive sustainability indices from 29 
institutional, environmental, economic and social variables for 131 countries. The application 
of PCA has several advantages. First, PCA is a weighting approach that may be used as an 
alternative to the more subjective weighting systems like public opinion polls, and second, it is 
a useful tool for improving the efficiency of indicators. However, it should be mentioned that 
PCA is not a panacea. It is limited to ex-post analysis and is not an appropriate tool for 
prospective analysis. In addition, because of the statistical nature of PCA, it can produce some 
results that are unjustifiable for researchers. Therefore, the authors suggest using PCA as a 
complement to subjective methods rather than a competitor. 
Tracking the dynamic performance of the selected countries, we can also assess total and 
regional sustainability. We showed the progress of institutional, economic and social 
sustainability for the period of research; however, the rate of change in these various measures 
is completely different. On a regional scale, although the overall trends in the economic and 
environmental pillars are similar for all regions, development of institutional and social pillars 
is dissimilar in different regions. However, when the institutional, environmental and 
economic pillars are strongly correlated, economic development cannot solely explain 
environmental deterioration. In fact, it seems that social and especially institutional pillars 
have a critical role in improving environmental sustainability. 
For the case of Iran, we found that the main development gap exists in institutional pillar. 
The next belongs to social pillar which can guarantee more balanced development. The above 
analysis can make a guideline for policymakers to set their targets and design their policies to 
address the main development gaps.  
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Chapter 3: 
Sectoral contribution in energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions: potentials for conservation 
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3.1 Introduction 
Like most of the oil-exporting countries, Iran is experiencing ever-increasing domestic 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions, mostly due to its price control policy. In 1967, final 
energy consumption was 49.58 MBOE1, but by 2008 it had reached 993.65 MBOE (Fig. 3.1). 
This translates to the Iranian economy experiencing, on average, a 7.73% increase in final 
energy consumption per year over the last four decades. The same pattern exists for CO2 
emissions. CO2 emissions rose 5.61% annually over the same period, from 67.94 MT
2 in 1967 
to 537.40 MT in 2008 (Ministry of Energy, 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 The trend in final energy consumption and CO2 emissions in Iran (1967‒2008) 
 
Since the 1980s, the main contributors to total energy consumption have been the 
residential, public and commercial (RPC) sector and the transportation sector. As Fig. 3.2 
shows, the energy consumption pattern has not altered in Iran in terms of the main contributors 
over the last few decades. The RPC and transportation sectors accounted for 39% and 29% of 
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final energy consumption in 1980, respectively; by 2009, their respective shares were 41% and 
30%. Indeed, the main change occurred as a result of a change in fuel consumption from 
refined petroleum to natural gas, especially in the RPC and industrial sectors. Whereas refined 
petroleum comprised 80% of total energy consumption in the RPC and industrial sectors in 
1980, it accounted for only 17% and 25%, respectively, of the required energy for these 
sectors in 2009. On the other hand, the share of natural gas used by these sectors increased 
from 7% (for both) to 68% and 61%, respectively, over the same period (Ministry of Energy, 
2012) 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Decomposition of final energy consumption by sector and fuel type in Iran (1980, 
1990, 2000 and 2009) 
 
An international comparison of patterns of energy consumption shows that one of the main 
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energy intensities were 189 and 118 TOE1/million USD (PPP) in 2009, the respective energy 
intensities in the same year were about 374 and 245 in Iran, almost twice the global averages 
(IEA, 2011). Fig. 3.3 depicts the trend in energy and CO2 intensities in Iran over the period 
1980‒2008. It is obvious that energy and CO2 intensities have risen rapidly, from 1.12 
BOE2 /million IRR and 0.73 tons/million IRR in 1980, respectively, to 2.20 and 1.26, 
respectively, by the middle of the 1990s, and so far they remain unchanged. It is noteworthy 
that in the calculation of the above intensities, the value addition of the oil and natural gas 
sector was deducted from GDP to provide a more realistic picture of the Iranian economy 
(Ministry Of Energy, 2010; Statistical Center of Iran, 2012). 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Trend in energy and CO2 intensities in Iran (1980‒2008) 
 
Different studies have been carried out to find out the determinants of the high energy and 
CO2 intensities in Iran. Using an index decomposition analysis (IDA), Sharifi et al. (Sharifi et 
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al., 2008) showed that structural changes have had little effect in decreasing the energy 
intensity in the manufacturing industries in Iran. Behboudi et al. (Behboudi et al., 2012) 
attempted to identify the key factors affecting energy intensity in Iran by applying an IDA over 
the period 1968–2006. Their results indicated that increasing energy intensity was the result of 
the reduction of productivity and changes in the structure of economic activities. In addition, 
they found that energy prices play a critical role in determining energy intensity in Iran. The 
results of the study of Fotros and Barati (2011) indicated that economic activities have had the 
largest positive effect on CO2 emissions in the economy, with the exception of the industrial 
and transportation sectors. For these two sectors, structural changes have been the main driver 
of CO2 emissions. Sadeghi and Sojoodi (2011) studied the determinants of energy intensity in 
Iranian manufacturing firms. A firm‘s size, ownership type, capital intensity and the wage 
level have significant impacts on energy intensity. 
The first step in designing any conservation policy is the quantification of sectoral total, 
direct and indirect energy intensities to track the sectors or commodities responsible for 
increasing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. The energy consumed by each sector and 
the pollutants they emit are referred to as the direct energy and pollution requirements. When a 
sector consumes goods and services, it causes environmental pressures and resource depletion 
through indirect consumption of energy and the emission of pollutants to produce 
corresponding commodities. The sum of these direct and indirect requirements of resources 
and pollutants is referred to as the sector‘s total requirements (Lenzen et al., 2004). By 
determining the direct and indirect requirements, the amounts of required direct and indirect 
energy use for producing one unit of value added can be measured in each sector, known as 
the direct and indirect energy intensity of that sector. Understanding energy and CO2 
intensities paves the way to assessing the effectiveness of any conservation policies at national, 
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regional, or firm levels. 
Energy input–output (E-IO) analysis is a frontier method that is popular among researchers 
for assessing resource and pollutant embodiments in goods and services on a macroeconomic 
scale. Using IO analysis, Lenzen (1998) examined the direct and indirect primary energy and 
GHG requirements for a given set of Australian final consumption. Lababderira and Labeaga 
(2002) used the IO method to obtain the energy-related CO2 intensity for the Spanish economy 
in 1992. Using the estimated CO2 intensities, they performed a structural decomposition and 
estimated the price effect of several hypothetical carbon taxes levied on fossil fuel 
consumption. Lenzen et al. (2004) used IO analysis and detailed household expenditure data to 
yield comprehensive energy use breakdowns for the 14 statistical subdivisions of Sydney. 
They used multivariate regression and structural path analysis to interpret the results. Cohen et 
al. (2005) used a generalized input–output model in order to calculate the energy embodied in 
goods and services purchased by Brazilian households of different income levels in 11 major 
cities in Brazil. 
Using a uniform energy price, Park and Heo (2007) transformed monetary IO tables to 
energy IO tables and studied the direct and indirect energy requirements of Korean households 
over the period 1980‒2000. Limmeechokchai and Suksuntornsiri (2007) quantified the 
embedded energy and total GHG emissions in final consumption in Thailand. Tarancón and 
González (2007) and Tarancón and Río (2012) proposed a combined IO and sensitivity 
analysis approach to determine the most CO2-emission-intensive productive relationships. 
Chung et al. (2009) used a hybrid E-IO table to calculate sectoral energy and GHG emission 
intensities caused by energy use in Korea. Chung et al. (2011) decomposed energy and 
emission factors derived from Korean E-IO tables into three affecting factors, i.e., an energy 
consumption effect, a social effect and a technological effect, over the period 1980‒2005. 
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Kerkhof et al. (2009) employed an environmentally extended IO table for the Netherlands and 
combined it with household expenditure data to evaluate the relationships between household 
expenditures and multiple environmental impacts, i.e., climate change, acidification, 
eutrophication and smog formation. Zhou et al. (2010) used an ecological IO table for Beijing 
to estimate the resource use and GHG emissions in the Beijing economy in 2002. Chen and 
Zhang (2010) employed an inventory and IO analysis to measure the GHG emissions 
embodied in the final consumption and international trade of the Chinese economy in 2007. 
Using an ecological endowment inventory and ecological IO model, Chen and Chen (2011) 
investigated GHG emissions and natural resources used in the global economy in 2000. Finally, 
Cellura et al. (2011) introduced an energy and environmental extended IO model and 
combined it with a Life Cycle Assessment methodology to study the energy and environmental 
impacts of Italian households‘ consumption. This chapter is the first attempt to quantify 
sectoral energy and CO2 emission intensities for the Iranian economy, and to detect the sectors 
with the highest potential in terms of reducing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
 
3.2 The methodology of energy input–output analysis 
Increasing oil prices during the late 1960s and the 1970s drew the attention of researchers 
and policy makers to studying the role of energy in the economy. IO models were appropriate 
tools to study the role of energy and the impact of energy conservation policies at the macro 
level. The traditional approach to E-IO analysis was developed by Strout (1967) and Bullard 
and Herendeen (1975). They included energy in the traditional IO analysis by defining a 
matrix of direct energy coefficients (D). Matrix D is the amount of energy type k required 
directly to produce a dollar‘s worth of each producing sector‘s output. This matrix could be 
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derived by calculating D=AP–1, where P is the implied energy price and A is the technical 
coefficient matrix. Therefore, total interindustry energy coefficients can be obtained from D(I–
A)–1. The deficiency of this approach is that it provides internally consistent results only when 
these energy prices are the same across all consuming sectors (including final energy) for each 
energy type (2009). It is obvious that the condition of uniform prices does not hold in most 
countries. 
As Chapman (1974) and Wright (1974) pointed out, matrices expressed in purely monetary 
terms do not correctly reflect supplies from the energy industries if the energy prices vary 
across different industries. This problem can be overcome if the monetary values in the IO 
table rows for the energy sectors are replaced by values expressed in energy units. Therefore, 
the new E-IO table is composed of ―hybrid units‖ whereby energy flows are expressed in 
convenient energy units (such as MBTU1) and nonenergy flows are expressed in monetary 
units (such as million IRR). 
Our E-IO table in this study was constructed in four steps. First, the last monetary IO table 
in Iran, published in 2001, was obtained from the Statistical Center of Iran (2005). The IO 
table of 2001 is a commodity table consisting of 91 sectors, including five energy sectors, i.e., 
crude oil and natural gas, coal, electricity, natural gas and refined petroleum products. Using 
the use table, the energy sectors were extended to 10 sectors. When the energy prices have 
been set by the government in Iran, they can be used for our preliminary conversion of 
monetary units to energy units (million BTU) (MOE, 2010). To obtain more accurate results, 
all available reports were used, such as the Energy Balances of Iran and Transportation Energy 
Data, to replace the more accurate energy flow data with energy flows obtained from unit 
conversion by average energy prices (MOE, 2003, 2010; MOP, 2009, 2010). Data for energy 
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prices in 2001 are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 
Domestic prices for different final energies in 2001 
Row Energy type Price in 2001 
1 Coal (IRR/Kg) 620 
2 Electricity (IRR/kWh) 
Residential: 72.93; Public: 99.59; Commercial: 273.86; Industrial: 133.58; 
Agricultural: 11.5 
3 Natural gas (IRR/m3) 
Power plant: 22; Commercial and public: 133; Industrial: 115; Education and sport: 
81; Residential (average): 60.5; Transport: 60.5; Refinery plant: 22; Petrochemical 
plant: 66.66 
4 Gasoline (IRR/Liter) 450 
5 Kerosene (IRR/Liter) 120 
6 Gas oil (IRR/Liter) 120 
7 Fuel oil (IRR/Liter) 64.2 
8 LPG (IRR/Liter) 150 
Note: The official and market exchange rates were 1755 and 7925 IRR/USD in 2001, respectively. 
 
In the second step, and following the energy conservation condition, energy use of all 
energy sectors was set to zero to avoid double counting (Kok et al., 2006) and energy 
consumption of nonenergy sectors was multiplied by energy loss coefficients (Miller and Blair, 
2009). It is noteworthy that from the authors‘ point of view, knowing the sectors that are really 
responsible for energy consumption and CO2 emission is more important than determining 
those that directly consume energy and emit pollutants. As Labanderia and Labeaga (2002) 
mentioned, for instance, electricity-related energy consumption and CO2 emissions should not 
be exclusively imputed to the electricity industry, because nonenergy sectors that are 
consumers of electricity are indeed responsible for production of electricity directly and, 
consequently, responsible for the consumption of primary energy and CO2 emissions indirectly. 
Calculating the energy and CO2 emission intensities of the final energies makes it possible to 
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recognize actual responsibility for increasing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
In the third step, the Hawkins–Simon (H-S) conditions should be checked (Hawkins and 
Simon, 1949). The H-S conditions ensure that, to obtain a nonnegative solution in a Leontief 
model (Miller and Blair, 1985): 1) all the diagonal elements in the matrix (I-A) must be 
positive, and all the off-diagonal elements must be nonpositive; and 2) the determinants of all 
leading principle submatrices (minors) in the matrix (I-A) should be positive (Chung et al., 
2009). The E-IO table constructed in our study satisfied both conditions. 
In the last step, the E-IO analysis is performed to derive the energy intensity of each sector 
stemming from the direct and indirect domestic consumption of the energy carriers. Then, the 
CO2 intensities can be calculated by multiplying energy intensities of the sectors to their 
respective CO2 emissions factors. The procedure for estimating energy and CO2 emission 
intensities is described in the next section. 
 
3.2.1 Estimation of energy and CO2 emission intensities 
In this section, we first explain the basic and original procedure for estimation of energy 
and CO2 emission intensities, and then apply our modifications to it. Although monetary and 
energy units exist in an E-IO table simultaneously, we have to redefine the conventional IO 
matrices. The basic procedure for performing an E-IO analysis was introduced by Miller and 
Blair (1985). Whereas n is the number of all sectors and k is the number of energy sectors, Z* 
(nn), x* (n1) and y* (n1) are the new transaction matrix, the new total output vector and 
the new final demand vector, respectively. f* (n1) is an artificial vector that is used to isolate 
the energy rows during matrix manipulation. These matrices are defined as follows: 
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Z*
x*
y*
0
f*
j
k
j
k
j
k
k
z for nonenergy rows
e for energy rows
x for nonenergy rows
f for energy rows
y for nonenergy rows
e for energy rows
for nonenergy rows
f for energy rows

 


 


 


 

                                      (3.1)                                                                                                         
In Eq. (3.1), zj, xj and yj are expressed in monetary terms and ek and fk are expressed in 
energy units. Therefore, the above matrices have the following format: 
Z* ; x* ; y* ; f*
. . . . 0
MBTU MBTU MBTU MBTU MBTU
Mil IRR Mil IRR Mil IRR Mil IRR
       
          
       
 (3.2).                      
The new technical coefficient matrix (A*) and the new Leontief matrix (L*) can be defined as 
usual: 
-1 -1.ˆA*=Z*(x*) ; L*=(I-A*)
. .
.
MBTU MBTU
MBTU Mil IRR
Mil IRR Mil IRR
MBTU Mil IRR
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  (3.3).                                                            
By using the A* and L* matrices, the sectoral direct energy coefficients ( δEI ) and the 
sectoral total or embodied energy coefficients ( αEI ) can be calculated by the following 
equations: 
-1 -1 -1
δ α
ˆ ˆˆ ˆEI =f*(x*) A*; EI =f*(x*) (I-A*)                          (3.4).                                                                           
In the above coefficient matrices, the values of the energy sectors are expressed in terms of 
MBTU/MBTU, which is the energy ratio of k energy sectors. What are important for us are the 
values of the nonenergy sectors, expressed in terms of MBTU/million IRR, which are in fact 
the energy intensities in the nonenergy sectors. Using a symmetric matrix of CO2 emission 
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factors (M (nn)), the sectoral direct CO2 emission coefficients ( δGI ) and the sectoral total or 
embodied CO2 emission coefficients ( αGI ) can be calculated as follows (Chung et al., 2009): 
-1 -1 -1
δ α
ˆ ˆˆ ˆGI =f*(x*) MA*; GI =f*(x*) M(I-A*)                      (3.5).                                                                 
We have made three modifications to the above procedure: 
1- As mentioned before, one of our targets is recognizing the sources of ever-increasing 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions in Iran. Therefore, we made the above analysis for the 
final energies consumed by utilizers. 
2- To avoid the double counting problem, the energy consumption of the energy sectors was 
set to zero. While the crude oil and natural gas products are consumed by all the other energy 
sectors or exported to the global market, this sector was dropped from the analysis. 
3- The assumption behind Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) is equal energy and CO2 intensities of 
domestic and imported commodities. A problem with this assumption is that many of the 
countries from which the imports originate face different energy and CO2 intensities (Lenzen, 
1998). To solve this problem, the energy coefficients are purified by using the import 
coefficient matrix ( -1ˆ ˆ ˆM*=IM(x*) ) and calculating the direct and embodied domestic energy 
coefficients ( dδEI and 
d
αEI ) as follows: 
d -1 d -1 -1
δ α
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆEI =f*(x*-M*) (I-M*)A*; EI =f*(x*-M*) (I-(I-M*)A*)      (3.6).                     
The same analysis was carried out to calculate the domestic CO2 emission coefficients. All 
of the intensities that will be reported in this study are domestic intensities. 
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3.3 Results and discussion 
As explained before, the E-IO analysis was applied to the 9595 IO table for the 2001 
Iranian economy. Table 3.2 presents the descriptions and categorization of sectors. In the IO 
table, the first nine sectors are energy sectors providing final energies for domestic utilizers. 
The agricultural and mining sectors contain six and five subsectors, respectively. The most 
elaborate sectors in the IO table are the industrial and service sectors, consisting of 29 and 46 
subsectors, respectively. 
In 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Iran was 737,909 billion IRR (92.61 billion 
USD) including the oil sector or 614,177 billion IRR (77.50 billion USD) excluding the oil 
sector. Producing 10.40 billion USD, the agricultural sector accounted for 11.27% of total 
GDP. The share of the mining and industrial sector was 34.70%, while its production was 
valued at 32.01 billion USD. The biggest economic sector in Iran is the service sector, which 
produced 48.02 billion USD and accounted for 52.05% of the total economy in 2001. 
 
Table 3.2 
Description of the 95 sectors in the input–output table for Iran 
Sector 
categories 
Name and code of sectors 
Energy sectors 1- Coal  2- Electricity 3- Natural gas 
4- Gasoline 5- Kerosene 6- Gas oil 
7- Fuel oil 8- LPG 9- Other refined petroleum 
products 
Agricultural 
sectors 
10- Agricultural products 11- Horticulture and market 
gardening products 
12- Live animals and animal 
products 
13- Products of bees and 
silkworms 
14- Forestry and logging products 15- Fish and other fishing 
products 
Mining and 
industrial 
sectors 
16- Iron ores and concentrates 17- Copper, ores and concentrates 18- Stone, sand and clay 
19- Other minerals 20- Water 21- Animal and vegetable oils 
and fats 
22- Other foods and beverages 23- Tobacco products 24- Textiles 
25- Wearing apparel 26- Leather and leather products; 
footwear 
27- Products of wood, cork, 
straw and plaiting materials 
28- Pulp, paper and paper 29- Basic chemicals and chemical 30- Rubber and plastics products 
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products; printed matter and 
related articles 
products 
31- Glass and glass products 32- Other mineral products 33- Furniture 
34- Basic iron and steel and 
their products 
35- Other metals 36- Metal products 
37- General-purpose machinery 38- Special-purpose machinery 39- Domestic appliances and 
parts thereof 
40- Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
41- Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
42- Radio, television and 
communication equipment and 
apparatus 
43- Medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopedic 
appliances 
44- Optical and measurement 
instruments, watches and clocks 
45- Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
46- Other vehicles 47- Jewelry and other unclassified 
products 
48- Residential construction 
49- Other constructions   
Service sectors 
 
50- Wholesale and retail trade 
services 
51- Lodging services 52- Food and beverage serving 
services 
53- Railway transport 54- Road passenger transport 55- Road freight transport 
56- Pipeline transport 57- Water transport 58- Air transport 
59- Supporting and auxiliary 
transport services 
60- Postal and telecommunication 
services 
61- Banking services 
62- Investment banking and 
financial intermediation 
services 
63- Insurance and pension 
services 
64- Renting services of own 
residential construction 
65- Renting services of rental 
residential construction 
66- Renting services of rental 
nonresidential construction 
67- Trade services of real states 
68- Leasing or rental services 
without operator 
69- Research and development 
services 
70- Computer and information 
services 
71- Other professional, 
technical and business services 
72- Agriculture, raising livestock 
and mining services 
73- Maintenance, repair and 
installation (except construction) 
services 
74- News agency services 75- Administrative services of the 
government 
76- Military and civil defense 
services 
77- Police and fire protection 
services 
78- Social security services 79- Public primary education 
services 
80- Private primary education 
services 
81- Public secondary education 
services 
82- Private secondary education 
services 
83- Public university education 
services 
84- Private university education 
services 
85- Other education and training 
services 
86- Hospital services 87- Medical and dental services 88- Other human health services 
89- Veterinary services 90- Social services 91- Religious services (Masjids, 
etc.) 
92- Arts-related services 93- Recreational and sporting 
services 
94- Museum and library services 
95- Other services   
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3.3.1 Direct and indirect energy intensities by sector 
Fig. 3.4 represents the energy intensities of the Iranian nonenergy sectors in 2001. 
Furthermore, Table 3.3 shows the energy intensities of the top 20 sectors. As is obvious, the 
highest energy intensity belongs to the ―pipeline transport‖ sector, which consumes 90.26 
BTU/IRR (or 715,310 BTU/USD). This sector is a relatively small sector that contributes less 
than 1% to the total GDP. However, the importance of this sector is due to its strong backward 
linkage (the backward linkage multiplier is about 1.89), in particular, the role of the sector in 
transportation of raw crude oil, natural gas and refined petroleum products in this energy 
exporting country. The second-highest energy intensity is for the ―other mineral products‖ 
sector. This sector, producing ceramic ware, clay products, cement, lime, plaster, concrete, 
building stone, nonmetallic mineral products and prefabricated buildings, consumes 22.54 
BTU for production of one rial of value added in this sector (or 178,629 BTU/USD). As for 
the transportation sector, the ―other mineral products‖ sector consumes most of its required 
energy directly. The third place is owned by the ―road freight transport‖ sector, which has an 
energy intensity of around 15.51 BTU/IRR (or 122,916 BTU/USD). The size of the last two 
sectors is substantial, accounting for 1.96% and 2.49% of total GDP in 2001, respectively. 
This means there is an opportunity for the Iranian economy to mitigate the energy 
consumption of the corresponding sectors by reducing their direct energy intensities. A list of 
the direct and indirect energy intensities of the sectors can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
As Fig. 3.4 shows, most of the nonenergy sectors consumed their required energy directly. 
The main exceptions are some service and industrial sectors. The services of rental own, 
residential and nonresidential constructions have negligible direct energy consumption and 
thus consume energy mostly through their nonenergy inputs. The next main exclusions are the 
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construction sectors, which consume close to 95% of their required energy indirectly. Out of a 
total of 86 nonenergy sectors, 32 sectors have indirect energy intensities that exceed their 
direct intensities. The sectors ―office, accounting and computing machinery‖, ―insurance and 
pension services‖ and ―radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus‖ had the 
lowest energy intensities of all the sectors. The total energy intensities of these sectors were 
0.14, 0.56 and 0.65 BTU/IRR, respectively. 
Generally, taking a macro view, most of the fuels (except coal) were being consumed 
directly in the nonenergy sectors in 2001. As shown in Table 3.4, 59.88% of total energy was 
consumed directly by sectors, while 40.12% was consumed through the consumption of 
nonenergy inputs. Kerosene has the highest share of direct consumption, with 66.59% of total 
kerosene consumed directly, mostly by ―basic chemicals and chemical products‖ (20.28%), 
―pipeline transport‖ (8.60%) and ―maintenance, repair and installation services‖ (7.35%). The 
ratio of direct consumption for gasoline was 63.21%, with the main direct sectoral consumers 
being ―road freight transportation‖ (42.77%) and road passenger transportation (30.12%). 
Electricity had a direct consumption share of 62.56%. The main sectoral direct utilizers of 
electricity were ―agricultural products‖ (16.33%), ―horticulture and market gardening products‖ 
(16.08%) and ―wholesale and retail trade services‖ (11.08%). The share of direct consumption 
for natural gas is 60.17%, with the sectors ―basic chemicals and chemical products‖ (21.21%), 
―basic iron and steel and their products‖ (18.16%) and ―wholesale and retail trade services‖ 
(14.30%) being the main direct consumers. In terms of the total sectoral consumption of gas 
oil, 57.84% of it is consumed directly. The main consumers are ―road freight transport‖ 
(55.61%), ―wholesale and retail trade services‖ (7.65%) and ―road passenger transport‖ 
(6.68%). The share of direct consumption of fuel oil is 54.46%. The major part of this fuel was 
directly consumed by ―other mineral products‖ (61.51%). 
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Fig. 3.4 Direct and indirect energy intensities of nonenergy sectors in Iran 
Table 3.3 
Top 20 sectors in terms of energy intensities in the Iranian economy 
Code Sector name Category 
Energy intensity (BTU/IRR) 
Total Direct Indirect 
56 Pipeline transport Ser. 90.26 88.80 1.45 
32 Other mineral products Ind. 22.54 19.27 3.27 
55 Road freight transport Ser. 15.51 14.33 1.17 
34 Basic iron and steel and their products Ind. 12.70 9.88 2.82 
31 Glass and glass products Ind. 10.77 8.67 2.10 
54 Road passenger transport Ser. 10.22 8.57 1.65 
35 Other metals Ind. 9.96 7.59 2.36 
20 Water Min. 9.60 7.31 2.29 
15 Fish and other fishing products Agri. 9.59 7.79 1.80 
58 Air transport Ser. 8.92 6.46 2.46 
91 Religious services (Masjids, etc.) Ser. 8.25 6.21 2.03 
29 Basic chemicals and chemical products Ind. 7.33 6.09 1.24 
95 Other services Ser. 7.22 6.48 0.74 
30 Rubber and plastics products Ind. 6.51 3.77 2.73 
11 Horticulture and market gardening products Agri. 6.46 5.20 1.26 
49 Other constructions Ind. 6.27 0.70 5.58 
48 Construction of residential buildings Ind. 5.97 0.08 5.89 
18 Stone, sand and clay Min. 5.97 4.69 1.28 
24 Textiles Ind. 5.83 2.71 3.12 
57 Water transport Ser. 5.24 3.93 1.31 
Note: Agri. = Agricultural, Min. = Mining, Ind. = Industrial, Ser. = Service 
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3.3.2 Total energy intensities by fuel type 
Fig. 3.5 depicts the composition of sectoral energy intensities in Iran by their fuels. The 
main contributors to the energy consumption of the pipeline transportation sector are natural 
gas (37% of the sector's energy intensity), fuel oil (26%), electricity (15%) and kerosene 
(12%). The energy consumption pattern of the ―other mineral products‖ sector is simpler, with 
54% of total energy consumption in this sector due to the consumption of fuel oil. The next 
main energy carriers are electricity, natural gas and gas oil, accounting for 18%, 11% and 9% 
of the total energy intensity of this sector, respectively. Gas oil and gasoline are the main 
energies consumed in the ―road freight transport‖ sector. 
The main energy carriers consumed in the nonenergy sectors were electricity, gas oil and 
natural gas. The total amount of sectoral electricity consumption was 1,326.55 TBTU, which 
accounted for 27.46% of total energy consumption by the nonenergy sectors in 2001. When 
the sectors consumed 1,272.85 TBTU, they covered 26.35% of their total energy requirements 
by consumption of gas oil directly and indirectly. Natural gas is the third most used energy 
carrier consumed by different nonenergy sectors. In 2001, the amount of natural gas 
consumption reached 886.82 TBTU, accounting for 18.36% of total energy consumption by 
the sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
Fig. 3.5. Total energy intensity of the nonenergy sectors by fuel types 
 
Table 3.4 
Direct and indirect energy consumption and CO2 emissions by fuel type and their shares in 
Iran (2001) 
Energy 
type 
Direct energy 
consumption 
Indirect energy 
consumption 
Total energy 
consumption 
Shares of direct and 
indirect energy 
consumption 
Direct CO2 
emissions 
Indirect CO2 
emissions 
Total CO2 
emissions 
Shares of direct and 
indirect CO2 emissions 
Direct 
(TBTU) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Indirect 
(TBTU) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Total 
(TBTU) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Direct 
(%) 
Indirect 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Direct 
(MT) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Indirect 
(MT) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Total 
(MT) 
Share of 
fuel (%) 
Direct 
(%) 
Indirect 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Coal and 
lignite; peat 
9.36 0.32 9.80 0.51 19.16 0.40 48.85 51.15 100.00 0.93 0.48 0.98 0.74 1.91 0.58 48.85 51.15 100.00 
Electricity 829.84 28.69 496.71 25.63 1,326.55 27.46 62.56 37.44 100.00 50.40 25.74 30.17 22.85 80.57 24.58 62.56 37.44 100.00 
Natural gas 533.57 18.45 353.25 18.23 886.82 18.36 60.17 39.83 100.00 31.85 16.26 21.09 15.98 52.94 16.15 60.17 39.83 100.00 
Gasoline 239.89 8.29 139.62 7.21 379.51 7.86 63.21 36.79 100.00 17.76 9.07 10.20 7.73 27.96 8.53 63.52 36.48 100.00 
Kerosene 47.19 1.63 23.68 1.22 70.88 1.47 66.59 33.41 100.00 3.34 1.71 1.68 1.27 5.02 1.53 66.59 33.41 100.00 
Gas oil 736.16 25.45 536.68 27.70 1,272.85 26.35 57.84 42.16 100.00 54.42 27.79 39.67 30.05 94.09 28.70 57.84 42.16 100.00 
Fuel oil 313.77 10.85 262.42 13.54 576.19 11.93 54.46 45.54 100.00 22.82 11.65 19.09 14.46 41.90 12.78 54.46 45.54 100.00 
LPG 47.49 1.64 36.32 1.87 83.81 1.74 56.66 43.34 100.00 3.21 1.64 2.44 1.85 5.65 1.72 56.76 43.24 100.00 
Other 
refined 
petroleum 
products 
135.09 4.67 79.25 4.09 214.34 4.44 63.03 36.97 100.00 11.11 5.67 6.70 5.07 17.81 5.43 62.39 37.61 100.00 
Total 2,892.36 100.00 1,937.74 100.00 4,830.11 100.00 59.88 40.12 100.00 195.85 100.00 132.01 100.00 327.86 100.00 59.74 40.26 100.00 
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3.3.3 CO2 emission intensities and the contribution of fuels 
Table 3.5 shows the top 20 sectors that had the largest CO2 emission intensities in 2001. 
The sectors are virtually identical to the top 20 sectors with the highest energy intensities, with 
only small differences in the ranking. This is a reasonable finding given that most final 
energies in Iran have a hydrocarbon base. Out of a total nominal capacity of 34,222 MW of 
electricity production in 2001, the capacity of the hydropower plants was only 1,999 MW, 
about 5.84% of the total capacity. The remainder belonged to diesel, natural gas and steam 
power plants, all of which consume hydrocarbon fuels. 
The ―pipeline transport‖, ―other mineral products‖ and ―road freight transport‖ sectors have 
the highest sectoral CO2 emission intensities. ―Pipeline transport‖ emits 5.94 tons of CO2 for 
production of one million IRR. In other words, for production worth one USD, it emits 47.12 
kg of CO2. The intensities for ―other mineral products‖ and ―road freight transport‖ sectors are 
1.56 and 1.15 tons CO2/million IRR, respectively, or 12.38 and 9.11 kg CO2/USD, respectively. 
In a similar pattern to the sectoral ranking for energy intensities, the sectors ―office, 
accounting and computing machinery‖, ―insurance and pension services‖ and ―radio, 
television and communication equipment and apparatus‖ have the lowest CO2 emission 
intensities, i.e., 0.009, 0.037 and 0.042 tons CO2/million IRR, respectively. The list of CO2 
emission intensities of the Iranian nonenergy sectors can be found in Appendix 3.2. 
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Table 3.5 
Top 20 sectors in terms of CO2 emission intensities in the Iranian economy 
Code Sector name Category 
CO2 emission intensity (kg/million IRR) 
Total Direct Indirect 
56 Pipeline transport Ser. 5,945.90 5,844.35 101.55 
32 Other mineral products Ind. 1,563.26 1,332.32 230.94 
55 Road freight transport Ser. 1,150.22 1,068.33 81.89 
34 Basic iron and steel and their products Ind. 811.98 625.10 186.88 
54 Road passenger transport Ser. 756.04 638.76 117.28 
31 Glass and glass products Ind. 696.79 556.76 140.03 
15 Fish and other fishing products Agri. 663.05 539.95 123.10 
58 Air transport Ser. 650.47 477.27 173.21 
20 Water Min. 641.65 486.19 155.45 
35 Other metals Ind. 636.44 478.40 158.04 
91 Religious services (Masjids, etc.) Ser. 542.98 406.76 136.21 
95 Other services Ser. 488.20 438.46 49.75 
29 Basic chemicals and chemical products Ind. 457.63 377.37 80.26 
49 Other constructions Ind. 435.31 51.07 384.24 
18 Stone, sand and clay Min. 421.70 332.92 88.77 
30 Rubber and plastics products Ind. 413.89 234.40 179.50 
48 Construction of residential buildings Ind. 410.93 6.09 404.85 
11 Horticulture and market gardening products Agri. 403.35 318.54 84.81 
57 Water transport Ser. 380.41 286.67 93.74 
24 Textiles Ind. 375.23 173.74 201.49 
Note: Agri. = Agricultural, Min. = Mining, Ind. = Industrial, Ser. = Service 
 
Fig. 3.6 shows the contribution of fuels to the emissions of CO2 pollutants in Iran in 2001. 
As is obvious, the main sources of CO2 emissions across the sectors are gas oil, electricity, 
natural gas, fuel oil and gasoline. In total, 29% of CO2 pollutants were emitted as a result of 
the consumption of gas oil. About 58% of this amount was produced by direct gas oil 
consumption, with the remainder emitted through the consumption of nonenergy inputs for 
which gas oil was a production input. Following gas oil, electricity is the second-highest 
contributor to emissions of total CO2, accounting for 25% of total emissions. From a primary 
energies perspective, the role of gas oil and natural gas should be given more consideration, 
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given that the main primary energies used for generation of electricity are gas oil and natural 
gas. However, as we mentioned before, one of the main reasons for substituting final energies 
with primary energies is to find the sectors and fuels responsible for the increasing trend in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions in Iran. Therefore, the role of electricity is similar to 
that of gas oil. In terms of total CO2 produced by electricity, 62.56% was emitted through 
direct electricity consumption and 37.44% emitted via the consumption of electricity to 
produce other nonenergy inputs. The share of natural gas in total emissions is about 16%, with 
60.17% of these emissions due to direct consumption and 39.83% due to indirect use. 
Consumption of fuel oil and gasoline account for 13% and 8%, respectively, of the total 
sectoral CO2 emissions. As for the other energies, the largest proportion of emitted pollutants 
is due to direct consumption of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Contribution of the final energy carriers to CO2 emissions across the nonenergy 
sectors 
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3.3.4 Opportunities to reduce sectoral energy and CO2 emission intensities 
Having gained an understanding of the size of the energy and CO2 emission intensities in 
Iran, we next need to determine which sectors can be targeted to reduce energy consumption 
and CO2 emissions. Undoubtedly, the sectors that are simultaneously the main consumers of 
energy and have the highest energy intensities should be considered first. Because identifying 
the sectors in terms of energy consumption or CO2 emissions gives us the same policy 
implications, we just explain the potential for CO2 emission mitigation in this section. 
Fig. 3.7 depicts the volume of CO2 emissions in each sector against their CO2 emission 
intensities. To ensure plausibility, we assumed that a conservation policy could mitigate the 
sectoral CO2 emission intensities by 10%. Applying this assumption into the model, we 
calculated the total mitigation of CO2 emissions that would occur in each sector. The sectors 
that could experience significant reductions in CO2 emissions, e.g., more than 1 MT, are listed 
in descending order as follows: ―road freight transport‖, ―other mineral products‖, ―wholesale 
and retail trade services‖, ―other constructions‖, ―other foods and beverages‖, ―agricultural 
products‖, ―basic iron and steel and their products‖, ―construction of residential buildings‖, 
―live animals and animal products‖, ―basic chemicals and chemical products‖, ―road passenger 
transport‖ and, finally, ―horticulture and market gardening products‖. From the above list, 
three subsectors are from the agricultural sector, three are in the service sector and the 
remaining six are in the industrial sector. 
Undoubtedly, conservation policies and plans should target transportation first, given that it 
is the main consumer of gas oil and gasoline. Increasing the share of public transportation, 
reducing the price gap between Iranian and international markets for gas oil and gasoline, and 
renovation fleet vehicles are the key policies that can strongly affect the energy consumption 
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pattern in this sector. A reduction of only 10% in the CO2 intensities of the road freight and 
passenger transportation sectors could mitigate total CO2 emissions by close to 4.5 MT. The 
next target for conservation policies and plans should be the producers of basic products, such 
as basic mineral, metal and chemical products. Most of these sectors were developed under the 
import substitution policy and they were fundamentally established and developed in an 
inefficient manner. The target of the import substitution policies influencing these industries 
was to make the country independent of imports of such strategic products. To attain this goal 
in an oil-exporting country, the energy efficiency criterion had the lowest importance. A 10% 
reduction in the CO2 emissions intensities of the sectors ―other mineral products‖, ―basic iron 
and steel and their products‖ and ―basic chemicals and chemical products‖ would reduce CO2 
emissions by about 2.5 MT, 1.5 MT and 1.2 MT, respectively. The construction and trade 
sectors are the other energy intensive activities in Iran. If any policy can mitigate 10% of the 
total CO2 intensities of these sectors, the amount of CO2 emissions would be reduced by 3.8 
MT in the construction sector and by 2.5 MT in the trade sector. The food industry is also an 
energy inefficient industry in Iran, because applying the same policy would reduce CO2 
emissions by 2.4 MT in this sector. Agricultural and livestock could experience a 3.9 MT 
reduction in CO2 emissions under such a policy. 
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Fig. 3.7. Total sectoral CO2 emissions against sectoral emissions intensities in Iran 
 
3.3.5 Energy consumption and economic value in Iran 
Following Costanza and Herendeen (1984), in this section, we will test the energy theory of 
value in Iran. An economy can be said to operate on an energy theory of value if economic 
value can be shown to be proportional to an appropriate energy indicator. Costanza and 
Herendeen (1984) show that one of the best indicators is sectors‘ direct plus indirect 
(embodied) energy consumption. To examine the theory, the logarithms of the embodied 
energy consumption of 86 Iranian nonenergy sectors are plotted and regressed against the 
logarithms of their total output. The results are depicted in Fig. 3.8 As the figure shows, there 
is a relatively strong relationship between sectoral embodied energy consumption and the 
sectors‘ production. While the simple regression results in a relatively high R2 (0.75), the 
covariance and Pearson‘s r of these two variables are also high, i.e., 2.32 and 0.86, respectively. 
The results of our study confirm the results of previous studies regarding the strong 
cross-sectional relationship between embodied energy and economic value. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94
C
O
2
 e
m
is
si
o
n
s 
in
te
n
si
ty
 (
to
n
s/
m
il
li
o
n
 I
R
R
) 
C
O
2
 e
m
is
s
io
n
s 
(M
T
) 
Nonenergy sectors 
66 
 
 
Fig. 3.8 Log-log plot of total energy consumption vs. total output of 86 nonenergy sectors in 
Iran 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to quantify the energy and CO2 emissions intensities across the 
nonenergy sectors in the Iranian economy. For this purpose, E-IO analysis was applied to the 
9595 IO table of Iran in 2001. Then, the sectors that had the potential to experience a 
significant reduction in energy consumption and CO2 emissions were identified. As explained 
above, the sectors with the highest potential to reduce energy consumption and emissions are 
the road transportation sectors, the sectors which produce basic mineral, metal and chemical 
products, the construction sectors, the food industry and the agricultural and livestock sectors. 
Although the energy consumption pattern is distorted by cheap energy prices, our study shows 
that the energy theory of value still applies in Iran. The next step should be to identify the 
policies that reduce energy and CO2 emissions intensities in these sectors. While the price gap 
between domestic and international markets is immense in Iran, removing the energy subsidies 
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should be considered first. 
However, it is of course necessary to note that we should interpret the results of this 
analysis with some caution. First, the input–output table used is from 2001. This raises 
concerns about the rigidity of the economic structure in Iran after a decade. Second, as for 
other quantitative approaches, E-IO has some limitations, such as price distortion during the 
process of unit conversion, aggregation errors in composing sectors and missing necessary 
products or services in the candidate sectors. However, it is widely used, especially because it 
provides reliable results from a macroeconomic perspective. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Energy intensities of sectors in the Iranian economy (BTU/IRR) 
Code Sector name 
Energy intensity 
Code Sector name 
Energy intensity 
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect 
10 Agricultural products 5.23 3.85 1.38 53 Railway transport 4.16 3.26 0.90 
11 
Horticulture and market 
gardening products 
6.46 5.20 1.26 54 Road passenger transport 10.22 8.57 1.65 
12 
Live animals and animal 
products 
4.25 1.60 2.65 55 Road freight transport 15.51 14.33 1.17 
13 
Products of bees and 
silkworms 
3.15 1.56 1.59 56 Pipeline transport 90.26 88.80 1.45 
14 
Forestry and logging 
products 
4.17 3.65 0.52 57 Water transport 5.24 3.93 1.31 
15 
Fish and other fishing 
products 
9.59 7.79 1.80 58 Air transport 8.92 6.46 2.46 
16 Iron ores and concentrates 3.64 3.15 0.49 59 
Supporting and auxiliary 
transport services 
4.18 3.21 0.96 
17 Copper, ores and concentrates 3.68 2.83 0.85 60 
Postal and 
telecommunication services 
1.28 0.93 0.35 
18 Stone, sand and clay 5.97 4.69 1.28 61 Banking services 1.40 0.93 0.47 
19 Other minerals 2.36 1.68 0.68 62 
Investment banking and 
financial intermediation 
services 
0.85 0.69 0.16 
20 Water 9.60 7.31 2.29 63 
Insurance and pension 
services 
0.56 0.26 0.31 
21 
Animal and vegetable oils 
and fats 
3.85 1.66 2.19 64 
Renting services of own 
residential construction 
1.14 0.00 1.14 
22 Other foods and beverages 4.70 1.20 3.49 65 
Renting services of rental 
residential construction 
1.14 0.00 1.14 
23 Tobacco products 1.42 0.31 1.10 66 
Renting services of rental 
nonresidential construction 
2.14 0.00 2.14 
24 Textiles 5.83 2.71 3.12 67 Trade services of real states 1.86 1.56 0.30 
25 Wearing apparel 1.36 0.28 1.08 68 
Leasing or rental services 
without operator 
0.74 0.09 0.64 
26 
Leather and leather products; 
footwear 
1.64 0.57 1.08 69 
Research and development 
services 
0.87 0.15 0.72 
27 
Products of wood, cork, straw 
and plaiting materials 
4.72 2.39 2.33 70 
Computer and information 
services 
1.10 0.72 0.38 
28 
Pulp, paper and paper 
products; printed matter and 
related articles 
3.99 2.69 1.30 71 
Other professional, technical 
and business services 
0.92 0.53 0.39 
29 
Basic chemicals and 
chemical products 
7.33 6.09 1.24 72 
Agriculture, raising 
livestock, and mining 
services 
4.70 3.16 1.53 
30 Rubber and plastics products 6.51 3.77 2.73 73 
Maintenance, repair and 
installation (except 
construction) services 
2.70 2.06 0.64 
31 Glass and glass products 10.77 8.67 2.10 74 News agency services 1.51 0.37 1.14 
32 Other mineral products 22.54 19.27 3.27 75 
Administrative services of 
the government 
0.81 0.37 0.44 
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33 Furniture 3.68 1.37 2.31 76 
Military and civil defense 
services 
0.99 0.54 0.45 
34 
Basic iron and steel and their 
products 
12.70 9.88 2.82 77 
Police and fire protection 
services 
1.49 0.97 0.52 
35 Other metals 9.96 7.59 2.36 78 Social security services 1.85 1.41 0.44 
36 Metal products 4.57 0.93 3.63 79 
Public primary education 
services 
1.82 1.60 0.21 
37 General-purpose machinery 1.01 0.33 0.68 80 
Private primary education 
services 
4.48 3.49 0.99 
38 Special-purpose machinery 2.00 0.47 1.53 81 
Public secondary education 
services 
2.74 2.44 0.30 
39 
Domestic appliances and 
parts thereof 
3.24 0.97 2.28 82 
Private secondary education 
services 
3.37 2.56 0.81 
40 
Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
0.14 0.03 0.11 83 
Public university education 
services 
5.03 4.15 0.88 
41 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
2.87 0.80 2.07 84 
Private university education 
services 
2.38 2.04 0.35 
42 
Radio, television and 
communication equipment 
and apparatus 
0.65 0.13 0.52 85 
Other education and training 
services 
4.21 3.48 0.73 
43 
Medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopedic 
appliances 
1.37 0.60 0.78 86 Hospital services 3.02 2.04 0.98 
44 
Optical and measurement 
instruments, watches and 
clocks 
0.69 0.20 0.49 87 Medical and dental services 2.61 2.32 0.29 
45 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
1.63 0.24 1.38 88 Other human health services 3.23 2.24 0.99 
46 Other vehicles 1.01 0.34 0.67 89 Veterinary services 1.41 0.98 0.43 
47 
Jewelry and other 
unclassified products 
3.50 0.39 3.11 90 Social services 4.45 3.48 0.97 
48 
Construction of residential 
buildings 
5.97 0.08 5.89 91 
Religious services (Masjids, 
etc.) 
8.25 6.21 2.03 
49 Other construction 6.27 0.70 5.58 92 Arts-related services 2.30 1.66 0.65 
50 
Wholesale and retail trade 
services 
3.13 2.20 0.93 93 
Recreational and sporting 
services 
3.29 2.51 0.78 
51 Lodging services 5.19 4.03 1.17 94 Museum and library services 1.05 0.72 0.33 
52 
Food and beverage serving 
services 
3.44 1.36 2.09 95 Other services 7.22 6.48 0.74 
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Appendix 3.2 
CO2 emission intensities of sectors in the Iranian economy (kg/million IRR) 
Code Sector name 
CO2 emissions intensity 
Code Sector name 
CO2 emissions intensity 
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect 
10 Agricultural products 340.28 245.39 94.89 53 Railway transport 306.05 242.47 63.58 
11 
Horticulture and market 
gardening products 
403.35 318.54 84.81 54 Road passenger transport 756.04 638.76 117.28 
12 
Live animals and animal 
products 
280.25 100.75 179.50 55 Road freight transport 1150.22 1068.33 81.89 
13 
Products of bees and 
silkworms 
211.23 102.00 109.22 56 Pipeline transport 5945.90 5844.35 101.55 
14 Forestry and logging products 274.93 237.81 37.12 57 Water transport 380.41 286.67 93.74 
15 Fish and other fishing products 663.05 539.95 123.10 58 Air transport 650.47 477.27 173.21 
16 Iron ores and concentrates 231.17 198.21 32.96 59 
Supporting and auxiliary 
transport services 
300.13 229.03 71.10 
17 Copper, ores and concentrates 249.22 190.94 58.28 60 
Postal and telecommunication 
services 
83.38 58.89 24.50 
18 Stone, sand and clay 421.70 332.92 88.77 61 Banking services 92.49 59.98 32.52 
19 Other minerals 159.57 112.76 46.81 62 
Investment banking and 
financial intermediation 
services 
53.75 43.26 10.49 
20 Water 641.65 486.19 155.45 63 Insurance and pension services 37.77 17.07 20.70 
21 
Animal and vegetable oils and 
fats 
253.30 106.32 146.98 64 
Renting services of own 
residential construction 
78.69 0.00 78.69 
22 Other foods and beverages 315.51 81.98 233.53 65 
Renting services of rental 
residential construction 
79.05 0.00 79.05 
23 Tobacco products 94.50 20.78 73.72 66 
Renting services of rental 
nonresidential construction 
148.85 0.00 148.85 
24 Textiles 375.23 173.74 201.49 67 Trade services of real states 118.44 97.90 20.54 
25 Wearing apparel 88.06 17.16 70.90 68 
Leasing or rental services 
without operator 
50.55 6.99 43.56 
26 
Leather and leather products; 
footwear 
109.56 38.25 71.31 69 
Research and development 
services 
58.28 10.43 47.85 
27 
Products of wood, cork, straw 
and plaiting materials 
314.69 157.62 157.07 70 
Computer and information 
services 
70.66 44.83 25.83 
28 
Pulp, paper and paper 
products; printed matter and 
related articles 
254.82 168.63 86.19 71 
Other professional, technical 
and business services 
60.57 33.80 26.77 
29 
Basic chemicals and chemical 
products 
457.63 377.37 80.26 72 
Agriculture, raising livestock, 
and mining services 
336.65 230.50 106.15 
30 Rubber and plastics products 413.89 234.40 179.50 73 
Maintenance, repair and 
installation (except 
construction) services 
198.07 154.81 43.26 
31 Glass and glass products 696.79 556.76 140.03 74 News agency services 105.60 24.87 80.72 
32 Other mineral products 1563.26 1332.32 230.94 75 
Administrative services of the 
government 
53.63 23.64 29.99 
33 Furniture 242.38 88.03 154.34 76 
Military and civil defense 
services 
69.58 38.80 30.78 
34 Basic iron and steel and their 811.98 625.10 186.88 77 Police and fire protection 99.98 64.47 35.51 
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products services 
35 Other metals 636.44 478.40 158.04 78 Social security services 117.98 87.77 30.21 
36 Metal products 297.20 58.52 238.68 79 
Public primary education 
services 
114.18 99.80 14.38 
37 General-purpose machinery 66.45 21.63 44.82 80 
Private primary education 
services 
279.43 211.20 68.23 
38 Special-purpose machinery 132.34 31.72 100.63 81 
Public secondary education 
services 
171.83 151.61 20.22 
39 
Domestic appliances and parts 
thereof 
210.80 60.88 149.92 82 
Private secondary education 
services 
210.62 155.46 55.16 
40 
Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
9.20 1.82 7.38 83 
Public university education 
services 
330.88 270.73 60.16 
41 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
191.66 55.79 135.88 84 
Private university education 
services 
150.45 127.19 23.26 
42 
Radio, television and 
communication equipment and 
apparatus 
42.54 8.27 34.26 85 
Other education and training 
services 
274.04 223.60 50.43 
43 
Medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopedic 
appliances 
89.33 38.02 51.31 86 Hospital services 192.94 128.39 64.55 
44 
Optical and measurement 
instruments, watches and 
clocks 
44.51 12.69 31.82 87 Medical and dental services 177.64 158.22 19.43 
45 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
107.44 15.29 92.15 88 Other human health services 201.98 136.60 65.38 
46 Other vehicles 67.84 22.45 45.39 89 Veterinary services 93.77 64.97 28.79 
47 
Jewelry and other unclassified 
products 
238.69 27.57 211.12 90 Social services 293.64 227.30 66.34 
48 
Construction of residential 
buildings 
410.93 6.09 404.85 91 
Religious services (Masjids, 
etc.) 
542.98 406.76 136.21 
49 Other construction 435.31 51.07 384.24 92 Arts-related services 148.28 103.75 44.53 
50 
Wholesale and retail trade 
services 
210.63 144.01 66.62 93 
Recreational and sporting 
services 
211.75 158.28 53.47 
51 Lodging services 330.17 250.54 79.63 94 Museum and library services 68.84 46.47 22.37 
52 
Food and beverage serving 
services 
225.94 84.30 141.64 95 Other services 488.20 438.46 49.75 
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Chapter 4: 
The impact of energy subsidy reform on producer 
costs and household expenditure in Iran 
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4.1 Introduction 
Despite some limited and specific benefits, energy subsidies impose substantial costs on 
modern societies, of which several studies overview the economic, environmental, and social 
impacts (UNEP, 2003, 2008; Ellis, 2010). In developing countries, Gupta et al. (2002) found 
that oil-exporting countries were the main net subsidizers of energy. Their study demonstrated 
that implicit energy subsidies in major oil-exporting countries averaged approximately 3.0% 
of GDP and 15.2% of explicit government expenditures in 1999. The IEA (2007) also 
concluded that oil exporters were major energy subsidizers. For instance, in 2005, Russia paid 
the largest subsidies in dollar terms, amounting to about 40 billion USD, most of which went 
to natural gas. Second placed in terms of subsidization, Iran subsidized mostly oil products, 
amounting to some 37 billion USD in the same year. China, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, 
Ukraine, Egypt, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan are in order the world‘s next largest energy 
subsidizers, many of which are also major oil producers. 
After decades disputing the necessity of subsidy reform, the Iranian parliament approved 
the Reform Act on January 5, 2010. The Reform Act envisaged the replacement of product 
subsidies with targeted transfers to the population, with some assistance to Iranian companies 
and the government. The Reform Act stipulated that households would receive at least 50% of 
the increase in revenues derived from the reform. Initially, the payment of benefits was to be 
in cash, while in a second phase, some of the additional revenues would support higher social 
benefits and public goods. Thirty percent of the additional revenues were to be used to assist 
Iranian companies to restructure to adjust to the new, dramatically higher, energy costs. The 
remaining 20% of additional revenues would go to the government to cover the government‘s 
own higher energy bill. Article 15 of the Reform Act authorized the government to establish a 
new Subsidy Targeting Organization to ensure the efficient centralized management of the 
74 
 
reform process.1 On December 19, 2010, Iran increased domestic energy and agricultural 
prices up to twentyfold, making it the first major oil-exporting country to reduce substantially 
its system of implicit energy subsidies. In the next phase, prices would increase progressively 
until the removal of all subsidies. Since the start of the first phase, the government has 
compensated for the burden of increased energy prices by transferring 450,000 IRR (nearly 40 
USD) per person to Iranian household heads. 
As the reform is relatively new, it is still too early to evaluate its effects on the Iranian 
economy, especially in terms of producer costs and household expenditures. However, the 
published official data show that the first phase of the reform increased the Iranian monthly 
inflation rate by approximately 1%. Fig. 4.1 plots the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in urban 
areas in the months preceding and following the start of reform (CBI, 2011). Such graphical 
analysis is of course limited; the aim of this chapter therefore is to investigate in more detail 
the inflationary impact of the energy subsidy reform on different nonenergy sectors and urban 
and rural households in Iran. For this purpose, we construct an input–output price model for 
Iran and use this to derive the energy cross-price effects of the nonenergy sectors in Iran. The 
results evidence well the substantial impact of the complete program of energy subsidy reform 
on production and consumption prices. 
 
 
                                                   
1 The Reform Act is available in Appendix 1. 
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Fig. 4.1. Iranian urban area CPI before and after the start of reform (2004/05 = 100) 
 
4.2 Literature review 
Several studies have considered the impact of new energy prices on total prices at the 
production and consumption levels. The input–output price model is one of the approaches 
used to analyze the effects of the fluctuations in energy prices. For instance, Llop and Pié 
(2008) analyzed the effects of a tax on intermediate energy use and a reduction in intermediate 
energy demand on production and consumption prices in Catalonia, Spain. Using a 
competitive and a markup price formulation in the framework of an input–output model, they 
found a tax on intermediate energy uses increases the consumer price index, and this in turn 
decreases the intermediate demand for energy and has a negative effect on private real income. 
However, levying a tax combined with a reduction in the intermediate demand for energy 
use not only reduces energy consumption, but also has no effect on prices and a positive 
impact on private real income. Llop (2008) used the same research questions and methodology 
in an examination of the Spanish water sector. The results of this particular analysis are similar 
to those found earlier. Nguyen (2008) also studied the impact of increasing electricity tariffs 
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on long-run marginal cost on the prices of other products in Vietnam using a static input–
output approach. He ascertained that such an increase would drive up prices in all other sectors. 
Given it would be difficult to implement this increase altogether, Nguyen (2008) 
recommended it would be better to increase the electricity tariff only gradually. 
Liu et al. (2009) evaluated how alternative policies, such as increasing the prices of 
intermediate electricity use and implementing energy-saving projects and reducing 
intermediate electricity use, may also affect production prices, consumption prices, and real 
income in rural and urban households in China. Applying an adjusted input–output price 
model, Liu et al. (2009) found that the increase in the energy price accounted for a general 
increase in production and consumption prices, but decreased household real income, 
especially in urban areas. A combination of two complementary policies was found to 
somewhat reduce prices. Combining the portfolio and input–output approaches, Suzuki and 
Uchiyama (2010) measured the risk of an increase in the producer price in Japanese nonenergy 
sectors associated with an increase in the price of imported fossil fuels. Using an input–output 
price model, they also measured the energy cross-price effects in nonenergy sectors. The 
results in Suzuki and Uchiyama (2010) indicate that almost all nonenergy sectors have reduced 
the risk of an increase in producer prices because of improvement in energy usage by upstream 
sectors. 
A number of international studies have already investigated the effects of subsidy phase 
out in the Iranian economy (Birol et al., 1995; Jensen and Tarr, 2003; AlShehabi, 2011). For 
instance, Birol et al. (1995) attempted to quantify the potential gains from both the removal of 
energy subsidies and an improvement in autonomous energy efficiency in Iran and two other 
oil-exporting countries. In a scenario where domestic energy prices meet international prices 
and energy efficiencies improve toward some autonomous rate of energy-efficiency 
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improvement, Birol et al. (1995) found the economic savings in Iran could be as high as 20% 
over the period 1993–2005. Using a multisector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, 
Jensen and Tarr (2003) estimated the gains in Iran from ‗tariffication‘ of nontariff barriers, the 
lowering of tariffs, the unification of the exchange rate for import purchases, and energy 
pricing reform. Regarding the relative importance of these several reforms, Jensen and Tarr 
(2003) found that the largest potential gains were from energy pricing reform, especially as 
this reform alone resulted in an estimated gain of 32% of consumption. 
Also in Iran, AlShehabi (2011) considered the effects of eliminating crude and fuel oil 
subsidies on the labor market using two alternative policy options. The first option 
redistributed additional revenues as extra income to households, while the second directed 
revenue into increased investment. AlShehabi (2011) found that even though real GDP and 
household welfare increased in the first scenario, wages and the quantity of labor employed 
both fell because of the Dutch disease effect and the increased costs of inputs. In the second 
scenario, and in the short run, the variation in the channeling of revenues accounted for a 
contraction in the labor market, though it would also continue to expand the market over time 
because of capital accumulation effects and shifts in the structure of the economy. 
The main pitfall of these studies is that they disregard the negative effects of policy 
reform that may slow the pace of reform or, in extreme cases, negate the policy itself. Several 
domestic studies have estimated the economic effects of energy subsidy reform in Iran. For 
instance, Khiabani (2008) employed a standard CGE model to examine the effects of an 
increase in the price of energy carriers on production costs, inflation, and economic welfare 
across different income deciles. The results indicate that if domestic fuel prices increased to 
their international level, the inflation rate would increase by 35%, output and employment 
would respectively decrease by 4.5% and 6.8%, and government revenue would increase by 
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40%. As an alternative approach, Ghaderi and Estedlal (2009) employed an autoregressive 
distributed lag model (ARDL) to measure the effects of an increase in the price of electricity 
by quantifying the compensating variation (CV) and deadweight loss (DWL) of Iranian 
residential consumers. They show that although CV and DWL increased in high-income 
groups, there was a more pronounced effect in low-income groups because of the typically 
larger expenditure share of electricity. 
Applying a CGE model and using a micro-consistent matrix, Manzoor et al. (2010) 
examined the effects of implicit and explicit energy subsidy phase out in Iran. They concluded 
that the policy would increase the inflation rate by between 57.9% and 69.07%, reduce total 
output from 2.11% to 2.22%, and decrease household welfare between 11.80% and 12.62%. 
Akhoond zade et al. (2011) used an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to appraise the 
welfare effects of energy price reform in the Iranian construction and transportation sectors. 
The results showed that the share of energy costs in total expenditure in the transportation 
sector was concentrated in middle-income groups, and declined as income grew. They also 
found that the CV was generally larger in higher-income groups and more significant in urban 
areas. 
Some studies have also examined the effects of energy subsidy reform in Iran using input–
output and social accounting matrix (SAM) price models. For example, Perme (2005) 
concluded that removing the subsidies on refined petroleum products, natural gas, and 
electricity would increase their respective average national price indexes by 19.52%, 11.07%, 
and 4.83%, respectively. Moreover, if the removal of all energy subsidies took place 
simultaneously, the price index would increase by 35.4%. In other work, Sharifi et al. (2008) 
showed that the sectors most affected by energy subsidy reform would be nonferrous mineral 
products, forestry, and refined petroleum products. They also found that electricity had the 
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highest inflationary impact among the energy carriers. Similarly, Shahmoradi et al. (2010) 
found that increasing inland fuel prices to their international level would increase consumer 
and producer price indices by 108% and 118%, respectively, while prices for freight and 
passenger rail transportation would experience an extraordinary 263% increase in service 
prices. In the absence of any protection program, social welfare would then deteriorate by 79%, 
especially in rural areas. Finally, Heydari and Perme (2010) provided evidence that removing 
the fuel and bread subsidies would potentially increase the related expenditures by urban and 
rural households by at least 33% and 40%, respectively. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Input–output price model 
The input–output price model, or more typically, the Leontief price model, is an analytical 
framework used to examine the effects of energy price fluctuations in a static manner. The 
starting point in the derivation of the model is summing the jth column in a standard input–
output table: 



n
i
jijj vzx
1
, 
or 
x =i Z+v                                                 (4.1) 
where x, Z, and v are the total outlay, transaction, and value-added matrices and i indicates the 
unity vector. Substituting ˆZ=Ax  and postmultiplying by -1xˆ  yields: 
-1 -1 -1
c
ˆ ˆ ˆx x =i Ax x +v x
i =i A+v
   
  
,                                    (4.2) 
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where -1c ˆv =v x  . The right-hand side of Eq. (4.2) is the cost of inputs per unit of output. 
Output prices are set equal to the total cost of production, so each price equals unity. The 
vector i can be interpreted as the index prices in the base year. If we denote these base-year 
index prices using the vector p, the input–output price model is as Eq. (4.3) (Miller and Blair, 
2009): 
c cp =p A+v or p=A p+v                                    (4.3) 
Following Suzuki and Uchiyama (2010), we make two modifications to Eq. (4.3). First, we 
externalize energy prices by decomposing Eq. (4.3) into energy (e) and nonenergy sectors (n): 
ee ne cee e
en nn cnn n
A A vp p
= +
A A vp p
       
             
                             (4.4) 
In Eq. (4.4), pe and pn are the respective index prices in energy and nonenergy sectors, vce 
and vcn are the value-added of the energy and nonenergy sectors per unit of production, and as 
an example in the technical matrix (A), Aen provides the share of energy input transferred to 
nonenergy sectors in the total outlays of the nonenergy sector. In a country like Iran where 
energy prices are set administratively, the price of energy is an exogenous variable. While the 
prices of energy carriers can influence the production costs of nonenergy products, the only 
significant equation that can be derived from Eq. (4.4) is as follows: 
 
   
n en e nn n cn
nn n en e cn
-1 -1
n nn en e nn cn
p =A p +A p +v
I-A p =A p +v
p = I-A A p + I-A v
 
 
  
                               (4.5) 
We can use Eq. (4.5) to examine the impact of an exogenously given change in energy 
prices. The assumption vcn = 0 yields the general form of the price model: 
 
-1
n nn en eΔp = I-A A Δp                                            (4.6) 
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The second modification involves the extraction of imported nonenergy commodities 
from the price model. This is because domestic energy prices do not determine the prices of 
imported nonenergy products. For this purpose, we need to modify Eq. (4.6) using the import 
coefficient vector of nonenergy products ( nmˆ ), where the elements indicate the ratio of the 
imported nonenergy products to the total demand of the respective sector: 
 
-1
n n nn en eˆΔp = I- (I-m ).A A Δp
  
  
,
                                 
(4.7) 
where nn n nnˆB =(I-m ).A . Eq. (4.7) can be rewritten as Eq. (4.8): 
-1
n nn en eΔp = I-B A Δp                                              
(4.8) 
In addition to analyzing the effects on production prices, we can examine the impact of 
the reform of energy subsidies on consumption prices. Consumption prices are conventionally 
defined endogenously using a normalized basket of goods, which define the weights of final 
prices (Llop and Pié, 2008): 
1
.
n
j
C j
j
c
p p
c
 ,
                                                 
(4.9) 
where pj are production prices and cj/c represents the share of final consumption for each good 
with respect to all goods consumed. We can also obtain an approximation of the influence of 
the revised energy prices on consumer real income. In particular, the changes in private real 
income (i) can be calculated using Eq. (4.10): 
1 1 1
( )
n n n
R R R
j j j j j J j
j j j
i i i p c p c p p c
  
         ,                    (4.10) 
where pj and p
R
j respectively indicate the consumption price of good j before and after the 
reform. These results will assist us in estimating an approximation of the compensatory 
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payments the government should transfer to consumers to cover any increased expenditure, at 
least in the short run. 
 
4.3.2 Decomposition of the price model 
While the Leontief price model assumes that the economic structure does not alter over 
time, Eq. (4.8) links the price change of nonenergy products to the price change in energy 
carriers. If we decompose Eq. (4.8) into its constituent parts, we can individually track the 
impact of each part. Given our purpose is to consider the impact of energy subsidy reform on 
the price of nonenergy products, we restrict the decomposition in our analysis to the price of 
energy carriers. Therefore, we decompose pe into the increase in the prices of each of the 
final energies as: 
e ELE NG GA KE GO FO LPGΔp =Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp ,                 (4.11) 
where ELE, NG, GA, KE, GO, FO, and LPG denote electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, 
gas oil, fuel oil, and LPG, respectively. Substituting Eq. (4.11) into Eq. (4.8) yields: 
 -1n nn en ELE NG GA KE GO FO LPGΔp =(I-B ) A Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp +Δp  .     (4.12) 
Multiplication of the first term in Eq. (4.12) reveals by how much the rate of producer 
prices in nonenergy sectors would increase given the change in the price rate of each fuel. 
When all the diagonal elements in pe are set equal to one, pn represents the cross-price 
effect of each fuel in the nonenergy sectors. We can then decompose the elasticities obtained 
from Eq. (4.12) into their direct and indirect impacts by substituting the Leontief inverse 
matrix with the equivalent power series. For instance, the first term in Eq. (4.13) indicates the 
direct impact of any electricity price change, whereas the remaining terms in Eq. (4.13) reflect 
any price effects in subsequent rounds (Suzuki and Uchiyama, 2010): 
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-1 2
n.ELE nn en ELE nn nn en ELEΔp =(I-B ) A Δp =(I+B +B +…)A Δp                  (4.13) 
4.4 Empirical results 
The last published survey-based input-output table is for 2001, issues by Statistical Center 
of Iran (SCI, 2005). The above symmetric table contains 91 commodities complemented by 
supply, use, import, and value added tables. The classification of commodities in this table is 
based on System of National Account 1993 (SNA93) and Central Product Classification 
Version 1.0 (CPC.V.1.0).  
To simplify the analysis, we aggregate the original table of 91 commodities into 37 sectors. 
Table 4.2 depicts the structure of our aggregated input–output table comprising primary energy 
products (crude oil and natural gas), final energy products (Sectors 2–10), and nonenergy 
products (Sectors 11–37). Because of the relatively low production share of coal as a final 
energy in Iran, we include this particular sector (11) among the nonenergy sectors. In addition, 
given the focus of our analysis is energy subsidy reform, we assume the prices in sectors (3) 
and (10), i.e. water and the other refined petroleum products, remain unchanged. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Introduction of primary energy, final energy, and nonenergy sectors in Iranian input–output 
Sector 
No. 
Energy sectors 
Sector 
No. 
Nonenergy sectors 
Sector 
No. 
Nonenergy sectors 
1 
Crude oil and natural 
gas (primary energy) 11 
Coal and lignite; peat 25 Jewelry and other products 
2 Electricity 12 Other ores and minerals 26 Construction 
3 Water 13 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery products 27 
Wholesale and retail services 
4 Natural gas 14 Food products 28 Lodging and serving services 
5 Gasoline 15 
Textiles and leather 
products 29 
Transport services 
6 Kerosene 16 Pulp, paper and wood 30 Communication and 
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4.4.1 Direct and indirect elasticities of fuels in nonenergy sectors 
Using the decomposition methodology of the input–output price model, we are able to 
calculate the total, direct, and indirect cross-price effects of electricity, natural gas, gasoline, 
kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and LPG for all of the nonenergy sectors. Fig. 4.6 and Table 5.3 
detail the cross-price effects by fuel and sector. 
As explained earlier, we calculate the elasticities by equalizing the rate of price increase 
of each fuel to unity. Therefore, we interpret the elasticities as indicating by how many percent 
the price of a specific nonenergy sector would increase if the price of a specific fuel were to 
double. For instance, the results in Table 4.3 show that the price elasticity of electricity in the 
construction sector (Sector 26) is 1.54. This means that if the price of electricity per kWh 
doubled, prices in the construction sector would increase by 1.54% per unit of output. Of this 
total elasticity measure, only 0.05% stems from the increase in electricity prices consumed 
directly in the construction sector with the remainder (1.49%) associated with the increasing 
prices of other inputs associated with the indirect impact of the same electricity price increase. 
 
products financial services 
7 Gas oil 17 Chemical products 31 
Real estate and rental 
services 
8 Fuel oil 18 Glass and glass products 32 
Research, development and 
technical services 
9 LPG 19 
Basic metals and metal 
products 33 
Production and maintenance 
services 
10 
Other refined petroleum 
products 20 
General and specific 
purpose machinery 34 
Public administration 
  
21 Electrical machinery 35 Education 
  
22 Media equipment 36 Health services 
  
23 Medical appliances 37 Other services 
  
24 Transport equipment 
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Fig. 4.2. Comparison of total cross-price effects of fuels in Iranian nonenergy sectors 
 
From Fig. 4.2, it is clear that except in the transportation sector (29), electricity has the 
highest cross-price effect of all of the final energies. In other words, an increase in the price of 
electricity can increase production costs, and consequently, the total inflation rate, relatively 
more than any other fuel. The highest price elasticities of electricity are in basic metals and 
metal products (5.47%), glass and glass products (5%), and coal and lignite (4.22%). In these 
sectors, the price increase is usually because of the direct consumption of electricity. The 
highest indirect elasticities are in basic metals and metal products (1.67%), construction 
(1.49%), and electrical machinery (1.30%). 
The results for natural gas are similar in that the total elasticities of natural gas are higher 
in the same sectors that are the largest consumers of electricity, i.e. basic metals and metal 
products (1.50%) and glass and glass products (1.07%). As with electricity, the price changes 
in these sectors are significant because of the enormous direct consumption of natural gas in 
these sectors. In addition, the greatest indirect elasticities of natural gas are in basic metals and 
metal products (0.39%), construction (0.33%), and electrical machinery (0.32%). 
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Because 99% of gasoline consumption occurs in the transportation sector, it is not 
surprising that an increase in the price of gasoline mainly affects prices in this sector. Put 
simply, if the price of gasoline were to double, the prices of transport services would increase 
by 2.85%. The respective direct and indirect elasticities of gasoline in the transportation sector 
are 2.53% and 0.30%, respectively. The next two sectors most affected by an increase in the 
price of gasoline are the construction and glass and glass products sectors with total 
cross-price effects of 0.48% and 0.43%, respectively. In sharp contrast, the price of kerosene 
has one of the lowest impacts on production prices, with the largest cross-price effects in 
chemical products, other services, and production and maintenance services. 
Because of their substantial direct consumption of gas oil, transport services, other ores 
and minerals, and glass and glass products have the largest cross-price effects of 0.94%, 
0.62%, and 0.39%, respectively. The largest indirect effects of an increase in the price of gas 
oil are in the food products and jewelry and other products sectors, with cross-price effects of 
0.19 and 0.17%, respectively. The highest cross-price effects for fuel oil are glass and glass 
products (1.95%) and transport services (1.32%), mainly because of its direct impact. In terms 
of indirect price elasticities, the price of fuel oil mainly affects construction, jewelry and other 
products, and glass and glass products indirectly. Finally, doubling the price of LPG increases 
the prices of chemical products and lodging and serving services by 0.70% and 0.13%, 
respectively. This is mainly associated with the direct consumption of LPG in these sectors. 
The highest indirect impact of an increase in the price of LPG appears in chemical products 
and textile and leather products. 
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Table 4.3 
Total, direct, and indirect cross-price effects of fuels in nonenergy sectors in Iran (%) 
Sec. no. 
Electricity Natural gas Gasoline Kerosene Gas oil Fuel oil LPG 
Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. Tot. Dir. Ind. 
11 4.23 3.99 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 
12 2.20 1.99 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.29 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.63 0.58 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 
13 0.59 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.10 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 
14 0.90 0.27 0.63 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.32 0.02 0.30 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.02 
15 2.42 1.71 0.71 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.10 
16 2.89 2.30 0.59 0.53 0.40 0.13 0.30 0.11 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.04 
17 1.31 0.83 0.48 0.48 0.35 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.70 0.60 0.11 
18 5.01 4.26 0.74 1.08 0.94 0.13 0.43 0.10 0.33 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.40 0.23 0.17 1.95 1.72 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.02 
19 5.47 3.79 1.68 1.51 1.11 0.40 0.32 0.03 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.02 
20 1.76 0.65 1.11 0.37 0.08 0.29 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 
21 1.93 0.63 1.30 0.38 0.05 0.33 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.05 
22 0.53 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 
23 1.50 0.94 0.57 0.27 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04 
24 0.79 0.17 0.62 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 
25 1.19 0.00 1.19 0.27 0.04 0.23 0.43 0.17 0.26 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.03 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.07 
26 1.54 0.04 1.50 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.48 0.13 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.09 0.18 0.37 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.02 
27 1.88 1.76 0.13 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.37 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 
28 1.31 0.91 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.01 
29 0.47 0.24 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.05 2.84 2.54 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.84 0.11 1.32 1.19 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.03 
30 1.25 1.05 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.28 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
31 0.30 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.01 
32 0.46 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
33 0.77 0.53 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
34 0.27 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
35 0.71 0.59 0.13 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 
36 0.90 0.78 0.12 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
37 1.62 1.37 0.24 0.53 0.47 0.06 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.02 
 
4.4.2 Price effects on producers and consumers 
Estimation of the cross-price effects of these several fuels paves the way to examine the 
impact of energy subsidy reform on production costs and household expenditures and real 
incomes in Iran. Table 4.4 provides information on domestic and regional energy prices before 
and after the reform. Clearly, the gap in prices between domestic and regional prices in Iran 
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has been considerable for much of recent history. Before implementation of the reform, the 
ratios of international prices to domestic prices for electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, 
gas oil, fuel oil, and LPG were 4.68, 22.96, 5.36, 38.7, 37.81, 41.49, and 11.49, respectively. 
In the first phase of the reform from December 2010, the government increased the domestic 
prices of these same fuels by 172%, 569%, 300%, 506%, 809%, 201%, and 223%, 
respectively. Article 1 of the Subsidy Reform Law requires that the domestic sale prices of 
energy carriers should adjust gradually until the end of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan 
(2010–15) to a level not less than 90% of Persian Gulf FOB1 prices. However, it is not clear 
when and in how many steps the next phases of reform will proceed. 
 
Table 4.4 
Domestic and regional energy prices before and after the reform (IRR) 
 
Domestic energy prices in 
2008/09 – before reform 
Average regional market 
prices in 2008/09 
Domestic energy prices in 
2010 – after reform 
Electricity 165 773a 450 
Natural gas 104.5 2400b 700 
Gasoline 1000 5362c 4000 
Kerosene 165 6392c 1000 
Gas oil 165 6239c 1500 
Fuel oil 94.5 3921c 2000 
LPG 309.1 3605c 1000 
a Export price (IRR/kWh), b Export price (IRR/m3), c FOB price of refined petroleum products in Persian Gulf 
(IRR/liter) 
Source: MoE (2010) and MoP (2009). Note: 1 USD = 9,917 IRR in 2008. 
 
 
Because of some ambiguity about the phases of reform and the market prices of fuels in 
2015, we examine the impact of the subsidy reform on production and consumption prices 
using two scenarios. The first scenario is where the price changes correspond to the first phase 
of reform in 2010. This is because analyzing the price impact of the first reform phase is 
                                                   
1 Freight on Board (FOB) 
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essential from a policy viewpoint, particularly as we can compare the results with the real 
initial increase in prices as reported by CBI. The second scenario assumes that domestic 
energy prices increased immediately to average regional market prices in 2008/09. In practical 
terms, the results of this second scenario can improve our understanding about the overall 
inflationary impact of a full energy price adjustment in Iran. 
Table 4.5, Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 detail the total, direct, and indirect impact of energy 
subsidy reform under these two alternative scenarios. It is apparent that the removal of energy 
subsidies principally affects the glass and glass products, transport services, and basic metals 
and metal products sectors. While the first phase of reform respectively increased the 
production prices of these sectors by 59%, 44%, and 24%, the removal of energy subsidies 
would increase production prices in these same sectors by 140%, 105%, and 70%, respectively. 
Four sectors are relatively unaffected by the increase in energy prices, i.e. research, 
development and technical services, public administration, media equipment, and real estate 
and rental services. We expect that by removing all or some energy subsidies in Iran, the 
increase in production prices in these sectors would not exceed 8% and 3%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.5 
Effects of energy subsidy reform on producer prices (%) 
Sector 
number 
Scenario 1: First phase Scenario 2: Complete reform 
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect 
11 12.09 9.70 2.39 32.62 26.10 6.52 
12 12.25 9.54 2.71 38.83 31.79 7.04 
13 5.42 2.01 3.40 16.61 7.19 9.42 
14 9.78 3.26 6.53 28.09 9.80 18.29 
15 8.38 3.75 4.62 22.72 9.04 13.68 
16 13.86 8.88 4.98 38.75 25.09 13.66 
17 10.39 6.28 4.11 36.82 24.72 12.10 
18 59.10 50.02 9.08 140.30 117.24 23.07 
19 24.22 14.14 10.07 70.16 42.29 27.87 
20 8.72 2.19 6.53 24.32 6.20 18.12 
21 9.34 1.83 7.51 26.29 5.12 21.17 
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22 2.89 0.70 2.18 7.88 1.86 6.02 
23 6.91 2.82 4.09 19.34 7.72 11.61 
24 4.63 0.61 4.02 12.82 1.81 11.01 
25 13.01 1.82 11.19 34.42 5.08 29.34 
26 15.78 1.44 14.33 40.95 4.82 36.13 
27 9.59 6.54 3.05 26.43 18.93 7.50 
28 9.17 4.87 4.30 28.68 16.90 11.78 
29 44.26 39.02 5.24 105.19 91.87 13.32 
30 4.38 3.12 1.26 10.88 7.61 3.27 
31 3.25 0.08 3.17 8.16 0.24 7.92 
32 2.32 1.12 1.20 6.52 3.30 3.22 
33 5.45 3.34 2.11 17.26 11.56 5.71 
34 2.32 1.62 0.70 5.97 4.13 1.84 
35 5.86 4.74 1.12 19.46 16.48 2.98 
36 5.44 4.32 1.13 17.76 14.40 3.35 
37 12.67 10.42 2.25 38.30 32.07 6.23 
 
 
As with the cross-price effects, comparison of the total and direct effects for both 
scenarios reveals that the sectors experiencing the largest total impact are the main consumers 
of energy, mostly because of their large energy input shares. However, the picture for indirect 
effects differs. The main increase in the price of nonenergy inputs resulting from the increase 
in energy prices occurs in the construction, jewelry and other products, and basic metals and 
metal products sectors. While increasing energy prices in the first phase respectively increases 
production prices in these sectors by only 1%, 2%, and 14%, it also increases production 
prices via an increase in the prices of the other inputs by 14%, 11%, and 10%, respectively. 
The indirect impacts in the second scenario for these sectors are 36%, 29%, and 28%, 
respectively. 
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Fig. 4.3. Direct and indirect impacts on production prices of the first phase (Scenario 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Direct and indirect impacts of complete energy subsidy reform on production prices 
(Scenario 2) 
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To understand the impact of the reform on Iranian households, we estimate the changes in 
consumption prices and real incomes of urban and rural households. For this purpose, we are 
using the detailed data for household final consumption exists in the original IO table. 
Through the aggregation process, the sectoral data of household consumption are aggregated 
at the same way to ensure consistency in the analysis.  
Fig. 4.5 and Table 4.6 show that by removing all energy subsidies in Iran, consumption 
prices would increase by 45.7%, representing a strong and highly destructive shock for most 
Iranian households. The results also reveal that rural families will suffer the burden of inflation 
more than urban families. For example, we expect consumption prices to increase by 42.8% in 
urban areas and 55.5% in rural areas. Comparison of the change in consumption prices across 
the first and the second scenarios reveals that the gradual phasing out of energy subsidies can 
control and reduce the impact of these potentially devastating shocks on households, 
especially poor households. Overall, the results from the first scenario show that the first phase 
of reform will increase consumption prices by 16.4% nationwide. In the second scenario, 
inflation would hit rural households particularly hard relative to their urban counterparts, i.e. 
17.5% vs. 16%. 
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Fig. 4.5. Impact of energy subsidy reform on consumption prices 
 
 
The loss in household annual real income under the two scenarios would be in the order of 
more than 238,000 billion IRR (about 21 billion USD) in the first scenario and 664,000 billion 
IRR in the second scenario (some 60 billion USD). Because of the relatively greater 
expenditures of urban households, urban households stand to lose between 1.46 and 1.23 more 
under the reform scenarios than would rural households. Because the Reform Law requires the 
government to compensate for the increased burden of charges, we calculate the compensatory 
payments per person in Table 4.6. As shown, if the government were to remove all energy 
subsidies, it would need to transfer 9.495 million IRR to each person annually, whereas the 
required amount is close to 3.405 million IRR in the first phase of the reform only. We can see 
a sizeable difference between what has been already transferred to households and that 
inferred by our model. At present, the government pays 450,000 IRR to each registered person 
per month, while the model instead proposes 283,750 IRR. In addition, the model suggests 
that the payments to urban residents per month should exceed those for rural residents, i.e. 
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315,000 IRR vs. 215,000 IRR. This lies counter to the currently equal compensatory payment 
to all Iranians, regardless of income or residence. 
Table 4.6 
Effects on consumption prices and real incomes 
 National Urban Rural 
Household consumption price changes: Scenario 1 (%) 16.37 16.04 17.52 
Household consumption price changes: Scenario 2 (%) 45.66 42.84 55.47 
Change in household annual real income at 2010 prices: 
Scenario 1 (IRR millions) 
–238,333,589 –181,428,899 –56,904,689 
Change in household annual real income at 2010 prices: 
Scenario 2 (IRR millions) 
–664,677,472 –484,519,372 –180,158,100 
Compensatory payment per person at 2010 prices: Scenario 
1 (IRR millions) 
3.405 3.780 2.587 
Compensatory payment per person at 2010 prices: Scenario 
2 (IRR millions) 
9.495 10.094 8.189 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The study examined the impact of energy subsidy reform in Iran under two alternate 
reform scenarios. The first scenario represents in fact what begun as the first phase of reform 
in December 2010, whereas the second scenario represents the removal of all energy subsidies 
at once in 2008/09 prices. We employed an input–output price model to consider the impact of 
the energy pricing reform on consumption and production prices in Iran, along with a 
decomposition model for deriving the cross-price effects of fuels in the nonenergy sectors. 
Our analysis revealed the tremendous inflationary impact of a complete energy subsidy 
reform on the production and consumption prices. The results showed that full reform would 
increase consumption prices by 45.7%. Further, although the increase in consumption prices 
affected rural households more, families in urban areas potentially lose greater real income 
because of their higher level of expenditure. In the reform procedure, the glass and glass 
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products, transport services, and basic metals and metal products sectors would experience the 
largest increase in production prices. Consideration of the sector cross-price effects confirms 
that of all of the fuels, electricity and gasoline have the largest impact on production prices. 
We now propose some policy implications. First, a gradual and phased reform process 
imposes lower inflation on producers and households and provides sufficient room for policy 
makers to modify any succeeding phases to help alleviate any negative effects. Second, given 
that the real income losses of households differ according to income and geographic location, 
the Iranian government should compensate for losses in a discriminatory manner with some 
households receiving relatively more (less) compensation for the increase in consumption 
prices. Finally, because the increases in the prices of some fuels, such as electricity and 
gasoline, have a potentially greater inflationary impact, the pace of the reform for these fuels 
should be more gradual. 
However, it is of course essential to note that we should interpret the results of this 
analysis with some caution. First, the input–output table used is from 2001. This raises 
concerns about the rigidity of the economic structure in Iran after a decade. Second, the 
Leontief price model has some deficiencies because of its relatively restrictive assumptions 
concerning the lack of substitution between factors and the null role of final demand in the 
economy price setting. Nevertheless, the general equilibrium nature of the model has a number 
of advantages over alternative partial equilibrium analyses, and thereby provides a better 
understanding of the possible negative consequences of energy subsidy reform at both the 
producer and consumer level. 
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Chapter 5: 
The impact of energy subsidy reform on energy 
conservation and CO2 mitigation 
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5.1 Introduction 
Iran is one of the main oil exporting countries, but has recently encountered the problem of 
large increases in energy consumption and CO2 emissions. The growth in energy consumption 
has been so strong that Iran has recently become a net importer of refined oil products. Iran 
consumed 325 MBOE1 of energy carriers in 1989, but this increased to more than 1000 
MBOE in 2009. On a per capita basis, final energy consumption was 6.10 BOE in 1989, 
increasing to 14.15 BOE in 2009. The trend is similar for environmental emissions. In total, 
602 MT of CO2 were emitted in 2009, compared with only 191 MT in 1989. Since the 1980s, 
the main contributors to energy consumption and CO2 emissions have been the residential, 
public and commercial sectors and the transportation sector (MoE, 2011). 
The growth in energy consumption is a result of various structural and economic changes. 
In the last two decades, annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Iran has average 5% 
per year (Table 1). Oil revenues have accounted for a significant share of total GDP, meaning 
that fluctuations in global oil prices are transmitted to the domestic economy. The recent boom 
in the world oil market has provided significant financial resources to the Iranian government, 
encouraging it to adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. This explains why GDP 
and the oil revenues are procyclical. Thanks to abundant oil and gas reserves, income per 
capita has increased considerably in recent decades. While the average income in Iran was 
more than 6000 USD (PPP) at the beginning of the 1990s, it almost doubled in the following 
two decades (World Bank, 2012). As energy products are normal goods, the increase in real 
income can explain the increase in energy consumption in Iran. 
                                                   
1 Million barrels oil equivalent. 
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The energy and CO2 intensities reveal other facts. Table 1 shows that whereas 1.08 BOE of 
energy carriers were consumed to produce 1000 USD of value additions (PPP) in 1989, energy 
intensity increased to 1.36 BOE/1000 USD in 2009, indicating 25% growth in two decades. 
Furthermore, CO2 emission intensity increased from 0.64 tons/1000 USD in 1989 to 0.79 
tons/1000 USD in 2009. Different studies have attempted to identify the determinants of the 
higher energy and CO2 intensities in Iran. Using an index decomposition analysis (IDA), 
Sharifi et al. (2008) showed that structural changes have had little effect in reducing the 
energy intensity of the manufacturing industries in Iran. Behboudi et al. (2010) attempted to 
identify the key factors affecting energy intensity in Iran by applying an IDA over the period 
1968–2006. Their results indicated that increasing energy intensity was the result of a 
reduction of productivity and changes in the structure of economic activity. In addition, they 
found that energy prices play a critical role in determining energy intensity in Iran. The results 
of the study of Fotros and Barati (2011) indicated that the structure of economic activity has 
had the largest positive effect on CO2 emissions, with the exception of the industrial and 
transportation sectors. For these two sectors, structural changes have been the main driver of 
CO2 emissions. Sadeghi and Sojoodi (2011) studied the determinants of energy intensity in 
Iranian manufacturing firms and found that a firm‘s size, ownership type, capital intensity and 
the wage level have significant impacts on energy intensity. 
The energy pricing system is the other determinant of ever-increasing energy consumption 
in Iran. Domestic energy prices have historically been set administratively in Iran at 
significantly lower levels than international or regional prices. Unsurprisingly, the government 
has filled the energy price gaps by paying enormous implicit subsidies. IEA (2010) reported 
that total energy subsidies exceeded 66 billion USD in Iran in 2009, the highest of any country 
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in the world. In other words, each Iranian received an annual energy subsidy of 895 USD, 
equal to 20% of GDP. 
Table 5.1 
Gross domestic product and energy consumption in Iran (1989–2009) 
Year 
Real GDP, 
PPP (billion 
USD) 
Real GDP 
per capita, 
PPP 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Energy consumption (MBOE) Energy 
intensity 
(BOE/1000 
USD, PPP) 
CO2 intensity 
(tons/1000 
USD, PPP) 
Residence, 
public, 
commerce 
(%) Industry (%) Transportation (%) Agriculture (%) Total 
1989 299.27 5600.36 6.18 140.72 43.39 63.26 19.51 90.77 27.99 29.54 9.11 324.29 1.08 0.64 
1990 340.23 6200.67 13.69 141.63 41.81 66.95 19.76 98.32 29.02 31.89 9.41 338.78 1.00 0.62 
1991 383.08 6832.07 12.59 158.56 42.41 72.95 19.51 109.28 29.23 33.11 8.86 373.90 0.98 0.60 
1992 399.37 6998.18 4.25 189.99 45.87 77.34 18.68 117.14 28.29 29.68 7.17 414.15 1.04 0.57 
1993 393.08 6784.15 –1.58 205.90 45.85 83.37 18.57 131.35 29.25 28.40 6.32 449.02 1.14 0.60 
1994 391.70 6660.56 –0.35 218.36 45.29 89.87 18.64 138.55 28.74 35.34 7.33 482.11 1.23 0.68 
1995 402.09 6728.73 2.65 220.70 44.72 104.67 21.21 136.97 27.76 31.15 6.31 493.48 1.23 0.68 
1996 430.64 7081.08 7.10 231.47 44.13 114.28 21.79 147.93 28.21 30.79 5.87 524.46 1.22 0.64 
1997 445.22 7186.05 3.38 242.12 43.92 126.23 22.90 153.22 27.80 29.67 5.38 551.24 1.24 0.61 
1998 457.42 7245.31 2.74 241.10 43.52 118.54 21.40 161.20 29.10 33.14 5.98 553.98 1.21 0.68 
1999 466.26 7253.83 1.93 252.48 43.24 131.01 22.43 170.20 29.15 30.27 5.18 583.95 1.25 0.82 
2000 490.24 7502.72 5.14 272.11 43.87 134.02 21.61 183.37 29.56 30.77 4.96 620.27 1.27 0.76 
2001 508.24 7664.12 3.67 278.29 43.64 134.97 21.16 194.13 30.44 30.37 4.76 637.75 1.25 0.78 
2002 546.43 8129.88 7.52 306.17 44.69 140.49 20.51 209.01 30.51 29.36 4.29 685.03 1.25 0.74 
2003 585.31 8599.68 7.11 316.67 43.78 154.31 21.33 220.82 30.53 31.59 4.37 723.39 1.24 0.72 
2004 615.07 8927.81 5.08 345.01 44.44 165.20 21.28 234.03 30.14 32.17 4.14 776.41 1.26 0.73 
2005 643.50 9228.24 4.62 371.72 44.25 181.33 21.58 253.31 30.15 33.73 4.02 840.09 1.31 0.76 
2006 681.43 9654.45 5.89 413.16 45.17 194.34 21.25 270.41 29.56 36.82 4.03 914.74 1.34 0.74 
2007 734.75 10285.53 7.82 436.55 44.57 236.05 24.10 269.21 27.49 37.60 3.84 979.41 1.33 0.73 
2008 751.65 10397.82 2.30 417.45 42.01 252.74 25.44 281.58 28.34 41.87 4.21 993.64 1.32 0.77 
2009 765.18 10462.27 1.80 431.90 41.43 258.05 24.75 309.20 29.66 43.35 4.16 1042.50 1.36 0.79 
Source: WDI (2012) and MoE (2011) 
To stop the growth in energy consumption, the Iranian parliament approved the Reform Act 
on January 5, 2010. The Reform Act included the replacement of product subsidies with 
targeted transfers to the population, with some assistance to Iranian companies and the 
government. The Reform Act stipulated that households would receive at least 50% of the 
increase in revenues derived from the reform. Initially, the payment of benefits was to be in 
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cash, while in a second phase, some of the additional revenues would support higher social 
benefits and public goods. Thirty percent of the additional revenues were to be used to assist 
Iranian companies to restructure and adjust to the new, dramatically higher, energy costs. The 
remaining 20% of additional revenues went to the government to cover the government‘s own 
higher energy bill. On December 19, 2010, Iran increased domestic energy and agricultural 
prices by up to twentyfold, making it the first major oil-exporting country to reduce 
substantially its system of implicit energy subsidies. In the next phase, prices would increase 
progressively until all subsidies were removed (Guillaume et al., 2011). 
This chapter investigates the fuel-conservation effects of energy subsidy reform in Iran. To 
study the conservation effects, a translog cost function is estimated and the own- and 
cross-price elasticities of fuel demands are derived. Using assumptions about the effect of the 
reforms on fuel prices, the reduction in fuel demands is estimated. 
Using translog cost or production function models, different studies have been carried out 
to estimate the elasticity of energy demand (as a factor of production) or the elasticities of 
different fuels (as constituents of the energy market) in developed and developing countries. 
The objective of these studies was to understand the sensitivity of consumers to fuel prices at 
sectoral, national, and international levels. For instance, some of the studies carried out at the 
sectoral level are Bölük and Koç (2010) for Turkey; Welsch and Ochsen (2005) for West 
Germany; Al-Mutairi and Burney (2002) for Kuwait; Christopoulos and Tsionas (2002) for 
Greece; and Berndt and Wood (1975), Humphrey and Moroney (1975), Lakshmanan et al. 
(1984), Debertin et al. (1990), Stratopoulos et al. (2000), and Urga and Walters (2003) for the 
United States. The national level studies are Vega-Cervera and Medina (2000) for Portugal 
and Spain; Ma et al. (2009) for China; Cho et al. (2004) for South Korea; Perkins (1994) for 
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Japan; and Magnus (1979) for the Netherlands. Some of the studies carried out at the regional 
or international level are Pindyck (1979), Renou-Maissant (1999), Söderholm (2001), and Roy 
et al. (2006). 
5.2 A translog cost model 
To measure the own- and cross-price elasticities of fuels, we employ the two-stage 
estimation of a translog cost model, suggested by Pindyck (1979). This approach is based on 
neoclassical theory and assumes that factor and fuel inputs are chosen to minimize the total 
cost of production (Renou-Maissant, 1999). We assume that aggregate production is weakly 
separable in the major components of capital, labor, energy, and materials. Furthermore, we 
assume that each of the above factors is homothetic in their components, such that we can 
specify a homothetic translog fuel cost-share equation. Under these assumptions, the aggregate 
production function is given by: 
( , , ( , , ); )Y F K L E OI NG EL M ,                          (5.1) 
where Y is gross domestic product, and K, L, E, and M represent the quantities of capital, 
labor, energy, and materials. Function E is a homothetic aggregate energy input function of 
three fuels, i.e., oil (OI), natural gas (NG), and electricity (EL). If the factor prices and output 
level are exogenously determined, the above production function can be described by a cost 
function that is weakly separable: 
 , , ( , , ), ;K L E OI NG EL MC C P P P P P P P Y ,                     (5.2) 
102 
 
where Pi are the prices of factors and fuels. The translog functional form can be considered as 
a second-order approximation to the above arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function 
(Christensen et al., 1973): 
2
0
1 1
ln ln ln (ln ) ln ln ln ln
2 2Y i i YY ij i j Yi i
C Y P Y P P Y P             , (5.3) 
where i,j = K, L, E, and M. In Eq. (5.3), 0YY   because of the assumption of homogeneity 
of degree one in price, 1i   and ij ji    because of the adding-up criteria, 
ij ji   because of the Slutsky symmetry restriction, and 0Yi   because of the 
assumption of homotheticity in the production function (Cho et al., 2004). Using Shephard‘s 
lemma, the conditional factor demands can be obtained by differentiating Eq. (5.3) with 
respect to input prices: 
ln
. ln ln
ln
factori i i
i i Yi ij j
i i
P PXC C
S Y P
P P C C
  
 
     
 

                
(5.4) 
The homothetic translog aggregate energy-price index (PE) function is given by: 
0
1
ln ln ln ln
2E i i ij i j
P P P P      ,                           (5.5) 
where PE is the aggregated energy price and Pi or Pj denote the prices of oil, natural gas and 
electricity. By differentiating Eq. (5.5) with respect to individual fuel prices, the fuel 
cost-share equations are derived as follows: 
ln , ,fueli i ij jS P i EL NG OI                                   (5.6) 
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It is clear that in the two-stage estimation approach, we must estimate the system of 
homothetic translog fuel cost-share functions first to compute the fitted aggregated energy 
price ˆ( )EP . Through the estimation of Eq. (5.6), the partial own- and cross-price elasticities of 
the fuels can be derived. In the second stage, by knowing the price indices of all factors, we 
can estimate the nonhomothetic translog factor cost-share equations (Eq. (5.4)). The Allen 
partial elasticities ( ii  and ij ), and own-price and cross-price partial elasticities of fuel 
demands ( ii  and ij ) are given by (Allen, 1938): 
2
( 1)ii i i
ii
i
S S
S


 
  and ij i jij
i j
S S
i j
S S



   ,                        (5.7) 
ii ii iS   and ij ij jS i j    ,                                    (5.8) 
where i and j are oil, natural gas, and electricity and Si and Sj are the cost shares of fuels. To 
control for technological progress and structural change in the postwar era, two other fuel 
cost-share models are specified. The first is a static model with a time trend (Eq. (5.9)) and the 
other is the first-difference model (Eq. (5.10)). The time trend captures not only the 
technological progress in the economy, but also the effects of the economic reconstruction and 
boom that occurred after the Iran–Iraq war in 1988. While the first-difference variables reflect 
the changes in variables, the first-difference model can show the short-term impacts (where 
the economic and structural variables are relatively more stable). 
lnfueli i ij j itS P t                                               (5.9) 
lnfueli i ij jS P                                                 (5.10) 
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5.3 Estimation results 
To estimate the fuel cost-share equations, we employed annual data over the period 1989–
2009. The period was shortened because of the Iran–Iraq war (the First Persian Gulf War) 
from September 1980 to August 1988. In this period, the Iranian economy experienced 
substantial damage, instability and structural breaks. To avoid estimation bias, we only 
measure the substitution elasticities in the postwar era. The nominal prices and final 
consumption of electricity, natural gas, and oil products were collected from the Energy 
Balance of Iran 2010 (MoE, 2011). The CPI is derived from the database of the Central Bank 
of Iran (CBI, 2012). The price index of oil is the weighted sum of the prices of the oil 
products. 
 
5.3.1 The fuel model 
Employing the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method, introduced by Zellner 
(1962), we estimate the system equations of the translog fuel cost-share function. Table 5.2 
reports the estimation results of the static model without a time trend (Eq. (5.6)), the static 
model with a time trend (Eq. (5.9)), and the first-difference model (Eq. (5.10)). As Table 5.2 
shows, all the coefficients except .NG OI  in the first model are highly significant. 
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Table 5.2 
Parameter estimation of the translog fuel cost-share equations 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
Table 3 represents the estimated Allen and price partial elasticities. As is obvious, the 
estimated elasticities in the static model without a time trend are significant at 10%. However, 
adding the time trend to Eq. (5.9) makes the Allen- and own-price elasticities of electricity (
.EL EL  and .EL EL ) insignificant. In the last model, four out of 15 elasticities are insignificant, 
which are the Allen- and own-price elasticities of electricity and natural gas ( .EL EL , .NG NG , 
.EL EL  and .NG NG ). Among the significant own-price elasticities, the elasticities of electricity 
and oil are negative, whereas the elasticity of natural gas is positive. The results reveal that if 
the real price of electricity increases twofold, the demand for it reduces by 8.4%. The same 
Coefficient 
Static model without time 
trend (Model 1) 
Static model with time 
trend (Model 2) 
First difference (Model 3) 
EL  
–0.053 
(0.023) 
–12.206 
(0.621) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
NG  
0.317 
(0.025) 
–8.136 
(0.404) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
OI  
0.736 
(0.024) 
21.342 
(0.764) 
0.990 
(0.002) 
.EL EL  
0.208 
(0.013) 
0.235 
(0.007) 
0.247 
(0.009) 
.EL NG  
–0.076 
(0.011) 
–0.048 
(0.006) 
–0.048 
(0.007) 
.EL OI  
–0.133 
(0.020) 
–0.188 
(0.005) 
–0.200 
(0.007) 
.NG NG  
0.085 
(0.010) 
0.091 
(0.008) 
0.076 
(0.008) 
.NG OI  
–0.010 
(0.014) 
–0.043 
(0.004) 
–0.028 
(0.005) 
.OI OI  
0.143 
(0.028) 
0.231 
(0.010) 
0.228 
(0.012) 
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increase in the oil price results in a 3.8% to 21.3% reduction in its demand. The story for 
natural gas is the opposite. If the reform raises the real price of natural gas by 100%, its 
demand increases by 25.3% to 33.1%. This finding is in contrast to the findings of some 
developing countries. For instance, Cho et al. (2004) and Ma et al. (2009) found that the 
own-price elasticities of all fuels are negative in Korea and China, respectively. Increasing the 
accessibility of users to natural gas through 189,484 km of pipelines, and relative cheapness, 
reliability of supply, and comfort in consumption, have been the main drivers of increasing 
natural gas consumption over the period of study. However, the subperiod analysis in the next 
section will show that the sensitivity of consumers to natural gas prices has changed. Overall, 
the above results show that fuel demands are inelastic with respect to their own prices. 
The Allen- and cross-price elasticities suggest that electricity and natural gas were 
complementary and electricity and oil were substitutable over the period of study. The 
substitutability between oil and electricity is confirmed for most developed and developing 
countries (Pindyck, 1979; Cho et al., 2004; Ma et al., 2009). However, several studies carried 
out at the national level indicate long-run substitutability between gas (LPG and LNG) and 
electricity in developed countries (Renou-Maissant, 1999). For natural gas and oil, Models 1 
and 3 confirm the substitutability of the fuels, while the second model suggests they are 
complementary. Some studies find substitutability between oil and gas (Perkins, 1994). 
Comparison of the cross-price elasticities reveals some interesting points. Although electricity 
and natural gas are complementary, the sensitivity of natural gas demand to the price of 
electricity is significantly higher than the sensitivity of electricity demand to the price of 
natural gas (e.g., –0.620 vs –0.106 in Model 1). In addition, the sensitivity of oil demand to the 
electricity price is almost the same as the sensitivity of electricity demand to the oil price. 
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Table 5.3 
The Allen and price partial elasticities of fuels 
Elasticity 
Static model without 
time trend (Model 1) 
Static model with time 
trend (Model 2) 
First difference (Model 3) 
.EL EL  
–0.199 
(0.072) 
–0.050 
(0.037) 
0.018 
(0.048) 
.EL NG  
–1.464 
(0.344) 
–0.554 
(0.210) 
–0.558 
(0.238) 
.EL OI  
0.378 
(0.092) 
0.122 
(0.024) 
0.065 
(0.031) 
.NG NG  
3.500 
(1.988) 
4.572 
(1.559) 
1.699 
(1.547) 
.NG OI  
0.728 
(0.386) 
–0.190 
(0.107) 
0.225 
(0.130) 
.OI OI  
–0.422 
(0.111) 
–0.075 
(0.041) 
–0.087 
(0.048) 
.EL EL  
–0.084 
(0.031) 
–0.021 
(0.016) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
.EL NG  
–0.106 
(0.025) 
–0.040 
(0.015) 
–0.040 
(0.017) 
.EL OI  
0.190 
(0.046) 
0.061 
(0.012) 
0.033 
(0.016) 
.NG EL  
–0.620 
(0.146) 
–0.235 
(0.089) 
–0.237 
(0.101) 
.NG NG  
0.253 
(0.144) 
0.331 
(0.113) 
0.123 
(0.112) 
.NG OI  
0.367 
(0.195) 
–0.096 
(0.054) 
0.114 
(0.066) 
.OI EL  
0.160 
(0.039) 
0.052 
(0.010) 
0.028 
(0.013) 
.OI NG  
0.053 
(0.028) 
–0.014 
(0.008) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
.OI OI  
–0.213 
(0.056) 
–0.038 
(0.021) 
–0.044 
(0.024) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. Elasticities are computed using the mean of each share. 
 
108 
 
5.3.2 The subperiod analysis 
The subperiod analysis provides a clearer image about the behavior of energy consumers. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the trend in the own-price elasticities of natural gas, electricity, and oil 
derived from Model 1. The same trends for the other models are illustrated in Appendix 5.1. 
As the figure shows, the own-price elasticities of oil and electricity were extremely stable over 
the period of study. For almost the whole period, the elasticities were negative and close to 
zero. In other words, the demand for oil and electricity were inelastic with respect to their 
prices in the last two decades. The demand for natural gas shows a different picture. The 
own-price elasticity of natural gas was positive until 2007 and then completely elastic in the 
years following the end of war. However, the elasticity reduced over time with some 
fluctuations and finally became negative in the last years of our study. That is, the sensitivity 
of consumers to the price of natural gas has increased gradually. 
As the target of this study is the assessment of the conservation effects of energy subsidy 
reform in Iran, the elasticities of fuels should be determined cautiously. Therefore, in addition 
to the average elasticities in Table 5.3, we calculate the averages of recent elasticities 
reflecting the shift in Iranian consumer behavior. Table 5.4 represents the average elasticities 
for the period 2007–2009. 
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Fig. 5.1. Trend in own-price point elasticities of fuels in Eq. (5.6) 
Table 5.4 
Average price elasticities for the period 2007–2009 
Elasticity 
Static model without 
time trend (Model 1) 
Static model with time 
trend (Model 2) 
First difference (Model 3) 
.EL EL  –0.078 –0.011 0.020 
.EL NG  –0.077 –0.007 –0.007 
.EL OI  0.155 0.018 –0.013 
.NG EL  –0.270 –0.023 –0.024 
.NG NG  –0.132 –0.082 –0.215 
.NG OI  0.401 0.105 0.239 
.OI EL  0.126 0.014 –0.010 
.OI NG  0.093 0.024 0.055 
.OI OI  –0.219 –0.039 –0.045 
 
The temporal change in the price elasticities of fuels reflects the temporal changes in their 
substitutability and complementarity. Figure 5.2 illustrates the trend in Allen-point elasticities 
of fuels over the period of study. The results for the other models are in Appendix 5.2. The 
figure reveals the stable pattern of substitutability between natural gas and oil, and electricity 
and oil. Although natural gas and electricity were complementary over the whole period, their 
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Allen partial elasticities reduced gradually. Given the reducing degree of complementarity 
between natural gas and electricity, we can estimate that if this trend continues, these two fuels 
will become substitutable in coming years. 
 
Fig. 5.2. Trend in Allen-point elasticities of fuels in Eq. (5.6) 
 
5.4 Fuel conservation effects of the reform 
As mentioned above, Iran started to remove fuel subsidies in successive phases in 2010. 
Article 1 of the Subsidy Reform Law requires that the domestic sale prices of energy carriers 
should adjust gradually until the end of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (2010–2015) to 
a level not less than 90% of Persian Gulf FOB1 prices. However, it is not clear when and in 
how many steps the next phases of reform will proceed. 
Table 5.5 provides information on domestic and regional retail energy prices before and 
after the reform. Clearly, the gap between domestic and regional prices in Iran has been 
considerable in recent years. Before implementation of the reform, the ratios of international 
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prices to domestic prices for electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and 
LPG were 4.68, 22.96, 5.36, 38.7, 37.81, 41.49, and 11.49, respectively. In the first phase of 
the reform, from December 2010, the government increased the domestic retail prices of these 
same fuels by 173%, 570%, 300%, 506%, 809%, 2016%, and 426%, respectively. 
Table 5.5 
Domestic and regional retail energy prices before and after the reform (IRR) 
 
Domestic energy 
prices in 2009/10 
– before reform 
Average regional 
market prices in 
2009/10 
Increase in 
nominal prices 
(%) 
Domestic energy 
prices in 2010 – 
after reform 
Increase in 
nominal prices 
(%) 
Electricity 165 773a 368 450 173 
Natural gas 104.5 2400b 2197 700 570 
Gasoline 1000 5362c 436 4000 300 
Kerosene 165 6392c 3774 1000 506 
Gas oil 165 6239c 3681 1500 809 
Fuel oil 94.5 3921c 4049 2000 2016 
LPG 309.1 3605c 1066 1625 426 
a Export price (IRR/kWh), b Export price (IRR/m3), c FOB price of refined petroleum products in the Persian Gulf 
(IRR/liter) 
Source: MoE (2011) and MoP (2009). Note: 1 USD = 9,917 IRR in 2009/2010. 
 
 
Using the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities of fuels, we can estimate the reduction 
in energy demand in the next step. As explained above, the elasticities measure the percentage 
change in fuel demand following a 1% increase in the real price of the same fuel or of other 
fuels. Table 5.5 shows the percentage changes in fuel prices after implementation of the 
energy subsidy reform in Iran. To measure the impact of the reform on energy conservation 
correctly, we need to know the inflationary impact of the reform. The following example 
highlights the necessity of knowing the increase in the general price level of goods and 
services. If increasing the price vector of fuels by 10% increases the aggregate price index by 
the same amount, the real prices of fuels do not change and consequently the demand pattern 
of consumers remains unchanged. 
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Several studies have estimated the inflationary effects of the energy subsidy reform in Iran. 
For instance, using a social accounting matrix price model, Perme (2005) concluded that 
removing the subsidies on refined petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity would 
increase their respective average national price indexes by 19.52%, 11.07%, and 4.83%, 
respectively. Moreover, if the removal of all energy subsidies took place simultaneously, the 
price index would increase by 35.4%. Khiabani (2008) employed a standard CGE model and 
found that if domestic fuel prices increased to their international level, the inflation rate would 
increase by 35%. Shahmoradi et al. (2010) found that increasing inland fuel prices to their 
international level would increase consumer and producer price indices by 108% and 118%, 
respectively, while prices for freight and passenger rail transportation would experience an 
extraordinary 263% increase in service prices. Heydari and Perme (2010) provided evidence 
that removing fuel and bread subsidies would potentially increase the related expenditures by 
urban and rural households by at least 33% and 40%, respectively. Applying a CGE model 
and using a microconsistent matrix, Manzoor et al. (2010) examined the effects of implicit and 
explicit energy subsidy phaseout in Iran. They concluded that the policy would increase the 
inflation rate by between 57.9% and 69.07%. Finally, using an updated input–output price 
model, Hosseini and Kaneko (2012) found that the first phase of reform would increase 
consumption prices by 18.86% nationwide. They showed that the inflationary impact of 
overall subsidy removal is about 54.10%. In this study, we use the estimated CPIs in the 
authors‘ previous study (Hosseini and Kaneko, 2012) to calculate the real prices after the 
reform. 
Using the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities of electricity, natural gas, and oil 
illustrated in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, and considering the percentage changes in real fuel prices in 
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the first phase and overall energy subsidy reform period, we calculate the percentage changes 
in fuel demands in Iran. To avoid any bias in the calculations, we replace the significant 
elasticities of electricity and natural gas with the insignificant ones in the second and third 
models. Table 5.6 shows the percentage changes in fuel demands after the implementation of 
the reforms. Table 5.6 is divided into four parts. Parts I and II show the percentage changes in 
the first phase and overall reform period using the averaged elasticities over the period 1989–
2009. Parts III and IV show the changes using the averaged elasticities over the period 2007–
2009. 
 
Table 5.6 
Changes in fuel demands of Iranian consumers in the first phase and overall reform period (%) 
 
1989–2009 
 
First phase Complete reform 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Electricity +15.430 –5.164 –16.645 –12.883 –24.053 –47.249 
Natural gas +182.579 +84.903 +131.787 +517.784 +335.536 +394.238 
Oil –39.168 –14.707 –6.266 –63.476 –38.751 –6.648 
 
2007–2009 
Electricity +15.770 –6.153 –18.376 +0.887 –11.004 –35.699 
Natural gas +63.173 +0.699 +30.686 +81.595 –34.971 +2.575 
Oil –27.443 –2.229 +6.472 –19.592 +5.894 +38.986 
 
 
In all parts, Model 1 shows larger changes because of the higher elasticities. In addition, the 
direction of changes is similar in Models 2 and 3. In Part I and Model 1, implementing the first 
phase would increase the demand for electricity and natural gas by 15% and 182%, 
respectively. It also reduces the demand for oil by 39%. In contrast, Model 2 shows that the 
first phase results in 5% and 15% reductions in electricity and oil demands, respectively, and 
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an 84% increase in the demand for natural gas. Model 3 estimates a larger reduction in the 
demand for electricity than for oil (17% vs 6%). Adjusting the elasticities, Part 3 shows a 
smaller increase in the demand for natural gas. In Model 1, the demand for electricity and 
natural gas increases by 16% and 63%, respectively. The only conservation effect of the 
reform is a 27.5% reduction in oil demand. Model 2 shows minor changes in demands after 
controlling for any dynamic effects using a time trend. Decreases in the demand for electricity 
and for oil of 6% and 2%, respectively, is the only outcome of applying the fuel price changes 
in the first phase. Finally, Model 3 shows increases in the demand for oil and natural gas of 
about 6.5% and 37%, respectively, whereas the demand for electricity decreases by 18%. 
Different models show contradictory results about the conservation effects of full subsidy 
reform in Iran. Model 1 in Part II demonstrates that the reform reduces the demand for 
electricity and for oil by 13% and 63.5%, respectively. However, it increases natural gas 
demand by about six times. Reductions of 24% and 39% in the demand for electricity and for 
oil, respectively, are the outcome of Model 2. On the contrary, it increases the demand for 
natural gas by 335%. Model 3 provides similar results, with estimates of the increase in the 
demand for natural gas of 394% and decreases in electricity and oil demand of 47% and 7%, 
respectively. If we consider the recent behavioral sensitivity of consumers in Part IV, we 
obtain more optimistic results. In Model 1, the full reform has no significant impact on 
electricity demand. In contrast, it raises the demand for natural gas by 82% and reduces the 
demand for oil by 20%. Model 2 provides the most optimistic results among all models. Based 
on the results of Model 2, the full reform reduces the demand for electricity and natural gas by 
11% and 35%, respectively. In contrast, it increases the demand for oil by 6%. In Model 3, the 
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demand for electricity falls by 36%. However, it increases the demand for natural gas and for 
oil by 3% and 39%, respectively. 
To evaluate the results, it should be noted that electricity, natural gas, and oil account for 
8.73%, 44.82%, and 46.45% of the 1160 MBOE of energy consumption in 2009, respectively. 
Therefore, further reductions in natural gas and oil demand would be desirable for the 
reform‘s designers. From a methodological point of view, the elasticities for the period 2007–
2009 better reflect the actual behavior of consumers, thus providing estimates that are more 
accurate. Consequently, the results in Parts III and IV are superior to the results in Parts I and 
II. The most optimistic results in Part III are from Model 2, which estimates 6% and 2% 
reductions in electricity and oil demand, respectively, and a marginal increase in natural gas 
demand after implementation of the first phase of reform. These results show a marginal 
impact of the first phase on energy consumption in Iran. However, if we consider the results of 
Models 1 and 3, we can conclude that the reform never reduces total energy demand, but 
rather will increase it. The same as for Part III, Model 2 provides the most hopeful results for 
the overall reform scenario. It diminishes the demand for electricity and for natural gas by 
11% and 35%, respectively, but increases the demand for oil by 6%. However, the results of 
the two other models are disappointing. They show that the full liberalization of energy prices 
either has no significant effects (Model 3) or it increases total energy demand (Model 1). In 
general, the results reveal that the reform may not be as successful as imagined previously. 
Under an optimistic view, it conserves energy marginally. Under a pessimistic view, it may 
increase energy demand because of inelastic demands and substantial substitution between 
fuels. 
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To make an image about the amount of changes in energy consumption and CO2 
emissions, we applied the above elasticities to the level of energy consumption in 2009. The 
results are shown in Table 5.7. Based on the price elasticities over the period 2007-2009, 
implementing the first phase of energy subsidy reform in Iran may reduce energy consumption 
about 15 MBOE under the optimistic view and increase it about 197 MBOE under pessimistic 
view. The same amounts for the complete reform are 161 MBOE (reduction) and 319 MBOE 
(increase), respectively. 
If we apply the emission factors to the changes in energy consumption, we can get the 
amount of direct changes in energy-related CO2 emissions in Iran. It should be noted that 
nationally 538 MT CO2 emitted in 2009. As it is obvious, the first phase may decline CO2 
emissions by 11 MT or increase it by 69 MT. On the other hand, the full reform may reduce it 
by 61 MT or increase it by 100 MT, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 
Estimated changes in energy consumption and direct CO2 emissions in 2009 
 First phase Complete reform 
Energy (MBOE) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1989–2009 +753.53 +356.80 +634.28 +2335.97 +1510.69 +1965.15 
2007–2009 +196.48 –14.60 +175.72 +319.43 –161.14 +187.18 
CO2 (MT) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1989–2009 +250.78 +109.56 +195.80 +747.29 +470.75 +615.06 
2007–2009 +68.98 –10.96 +45.58 +100.38 –61.11 +46.76 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the fuel conservation effects of energy subsidy reform in Iran were studied. 
To measure the impact of the first phase and overall reform on energy demand in Iran, a 
translog cost function of the energy market was estimated and the own- and cross-price 
elasticities of electricity, natural gas, and oil were derived. The results of this study can be 
summarized in the following points. 
First, the own-price elasticities of electricity and oil are negative and the own-price 
elasticity of natural gas is positive over the period of study. Second, electricity and natural gas 
are complements and electricity and oil are substitutes over the period of study. In addition, 
most of the models find substitutability between natural gas and oil. Third, the own-price 
elasticities of oil and electricity are highly stable and close to zero over the period of study. 
However, the positive elasticity of natural gas declines over time and becomes negative in the 
last years of our study. 
Finally, we found that the reform might not hit its targets. Under an optimistic view, the 
reform may conserve energy marginally, and under a pessimistic view, it may increase energy 
consumption because of inelastic fuel demands and substantial substitution between them. As 
a policy implication, the above results suggest that other conservation strategies, such as 
training, technological progress and regulation improvement, etc., are alternatives to the price 
reform policy. 
From a social perspective, the unsatisfactory conservation outcome of the reform should be 
considered alongside the effects of the reform on key economic, social, and environmental 
variables. If we consider the total impact of the reform, we can evaluate its sustainability in 
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Iran. The question of the sustainability of the reform is one that will be answered in the next 
chapter. . 
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Appendix 5.1 
Own-price point elasticities of fuels in the static model with trend (A) and first-difference 
model (B) 
 
(A) Static model with time trend 
 
(B) First-difference model 
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Appendix 5.2 
Allen-point elasticities of fuels in the static model with trend (A) and the first-difference 
model (B) 
 
(A) Static model with time trend 
 
(B) First-difference model 
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Chapter 6: 
The sustainability of the reform: lessons learned and 
further studies 
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6.1 Lessons learned 
In the previous chapters, the impacts of energy subsidy reform on selected variables in 
different pillars are studied. In the second chapter, the energy and CO2 emissions intensities 
across the nonenergy sectors were quantified in the Iranian economy. Therefore, the sectors 
that had the potential to experience a significant reduction in energy consumption and CO2 
emissions were identified. The results showed that the sectors with the highest potential to 
reduce energy consumption and emissions are the road transportation sectors, the sectors 
which produce basic mineral, metal and chemical products, the construction sectors, the food 
industry and the agricultural and livestock sectors. 
In the third chapter, the impact of energy subsidy reform on producer cost and consumer 
expenditure is examined. Our analysis revealed the tremendous inflationary impact of a 
complete energy subsidy reform on the production and consumption prices. The results 
showed that full reform would increase consumption prices by 45.7%. Further, although the 
increase in consumption prices affected rural households more, families in urban areas 
potentially lose greater real income because of their higher level of expenditure. In the reform 
procedure, the glass and glass products, transport services, and basic metals and metal 
products sectors would experience the largest increase in production prices. Consideration of 
the sector cross-price effects confirms that of all of the fuels, electricity and gasoline have the 
largest impact on production prices. 
In chapter four, the impact of reform on energy demand and CO2 emission is examined. 
What we found is that the reform may not hit its targets. Under the optimistic view, the reform 
may conserve energy marginally and under the pessimistic view, it may increase the energy 
demand due to inelastic fuel demand and substantial substitution between them. 
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6.2 Sustainability assessment 
To make a final conclusion about the sustainability of energy subsidy reform in Iran, we 
need to remember the concept of sustainability once more. As explained before, sustainable 
development is addressing four pillars of sustainability (institutional, social, environmental, 
and economic) which are integrated and interlinked in a comprehensive manner Indeed, 
sustainable development that aims to restore equilibrium between institutional, environmental, 
economic and social values leads us to square diagrams when discrimination between pillars, 
i.e. non-sustainability, can be shown by rectangles or trapezoids (Fig. 6.1) 
 
 
Fig 6.1. The concept of sustainability and non-sustainability 
 
Now, let‘s compare the above figure with our findings in Chapter 2. Fig. 6.2 depicts the 
current situation in Iran. As it is obvious, the development in Iran could not address the 
equilibrium criteria. While, the country experienced somewhat progress in social, 
environmental, and economic pillars, the development level in institutional pillar is far behind 
the development frontiers. Therefore, we can conclude that the unsustainability features of 
Iran are more prevailing.   
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Fig. 6.2. The sustainability of Iran in institutional, social, environmental and economic pillars 
 
What is clear from Fig. 6.2 is that institutional development should the main priority for 
policymakers. Institutional development not only increases the inter-pillar balance, but also 
may create some inter-pillar spillover effects. The next would be social development. The 
development without equality increases the social gaps and disparities in the country. The next 
priorities would be economic and environmental developments. 
What does the energy subsidy reform address in Iran? Which pillars are improving and 
which are deteriorating? Is it basically a sustainable policy? What we studied in this thesis was 
the short-term impacts of energy subsidy reform on particular key social, economic and 
environmental variables. We did not include the institutional pillar because the short-term 
impact of the reform on good governance criteria is marginal. However, we may find some 
impacts in the long-term through the reduction of rent-seeking activities (e.g. smuggling) and 
increasing some financial resources for the government to supply more public goods and 
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services. However, the reform cannot improve the quality of governance in the short-term and 
so it fails to address the main problematic pillar in Iran. 
The other short-term impacts investigated in this thesis are shown in Table 6.1. As we 
mentioned before, the list of affected variables are undoubtedly more than what we studied. 
However, it seems that the above key variables can show the overall direction and pace of the 
impacts. The first impact is on the social pillar that can be represented by changing in 
household expenditure measured in Chapter 4. In contrary to income that can be located in 
economic pillar, household expenditure can be grouped in the pillar of social development. 
Household expenditure has direct and indirect effects on the variables mentioned in social 
pillar (Table 2.2). Changing the household expenditure would undoubtedly result in changing 
the level of health and education expenditures. Indirectly, the final impact would be on the 
social variables such as life expectancy at birth, mortality rate, and gender discrimination. In 
addition, as we learned in Chapter 4, the reform has not the same impact on the rural and 
urban households. The results revealed that rural families will suffer the burden of inflation 
more than urban families. We expect consumption prices to increase by 42.8% in urban areas 
and 55.5% in rural areas. This means that by increasing the household expenditure, the 
inequality between urban and rural households is rising that leads to more social disparities in 
the Iranian society. 
The next impact is on the environmental sustainability. The target variable is social cost of 
CO2 emission that measured in Chapter 5. The social cost of CO2 emission is measured by 
multiplying the amount of CO2 emission changes, in two optimistic and pessimistic views, by 
unit social cost of CO2 emission reported by MoE (2011) (1 ton CO2 = 80,000 IRR at prices in 
2001). The same component exists in Table 2.2 that reflects the carbon dioxide damage in the 
selected countries.  
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The last impact is on economic pillar that the value of conserved energy can show it. The 
amount of conservation in energy consumption is derived from Table 5.7 and grouped in two 
optimistic and pessimistic estimations. The conserved energy is converted to the monetary 
term by international prices in 2010. 
The estimated impacts on these three pillars, i.e. social (household expenditure), 
economic (energy consumption), and environmental (CO2 emissions), are monetized and 
showed in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 
Some short-term costs and benefits of energy subsidy reform in Iran (Million IRR at 2010 
prices) 
 
First Phase Complete Reform 
 
Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
Social pillar (household 
expenditure) 
-238,333,589 -238,333,589 -664,677,472 -664,677,472 
Economic pillar (energy 
consumption) 
17,473,315 -66,546,375 54,896,652 -143,933,175 
Environmental pillar 
(CO2 emission) 
2,600,634 -10,819,655 14,507,541 -23,829,225 
Note: 1 ton CO2 emissions = 80,000 IRR at 2001 prices (MoE, 2011) 
 
It should be mentioned that comparison between social cost and the other economic and 
environmental costs should be made cautiously. The reason roots in the methodology used to 
estimate each one. To estimate the impact of the reform on household expenditure, we 
employed the IO price model that assumes no substitutability between inputs. However, the 
main idea behind the estimation of translog cost function in Chapter 5 is the possibility of 
fuels to be substituted with each other. Although the assumptions in two IO price model and 
translog cost function are different, the both approaches are common in one point that is the 
short-term nature of them. IO price model assumes that the economic structure remains 
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unchanged through the reform and the translog model assumes that the production level (i.e. 
GDP) in the economy remains fixed that just happens in the short term. Therefore, both of the 
results can be justified as the short-term impacts. 
All in all, the results in Table 6.1 show that in the both of optimistic and pessimistic 
estimations, the energy subsidy reform is an unsustainable policy either in the first phase or in 
the whole of it. The negative impact on the social pillar is such drastic that fades the probable 
conservational benefits. Therefore, we can come into this final conclusion that Iranian society 
becomes a net loser after implementing the reform.  
 
6.3 Further studies   
While we just investigated the short-term impacts in this thesis, studying the long-run 
institutional, social, economic and environmental effects of energy subsidy reform is required. 
Although, it is noteworthy that these are the short-term impacts that make the long-term one. 
The key point in our analysis is that if the short-term impacts are not such bearable for the 
economy and the society, the government cannot implement all of the phases. Therefore, if the 
current trend continues, it is not surprising to see that the reform stopped by Iranian 
government or parliament. 
The other interesting field of study is the political economy of the reform. The question 
raised for every researcher (especially Iranian economists who are suffering the consequences 
of the reforms) is that when the consumers and producers are the net losers and beside, the 
reform cannot hit its conservation targets in the short-term, why the government insists on the 
continuity of the reform on its original form. When the reform coincided with the tight 
sanctions against Iran, why the government insists on its continuity? These are the questions 
that should be answered in the next studies. However, the preliminary answer is that the 
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perseverance of the government roots in its political interests rather than economic or 
developmental motives.  
The public choice theories can explain the behavior of the Iranian government well. 
Public choice or public choice theory has been described as the use of economic tools to deal 
with traditional problems of political science. It is often used to explain how political 
decision-making results in outcomes that conflict with the preferences of the general public. 
 Public choice theory attempts to look at governments from the perspective of the 
bureaucrats and politicians who compose them, and makes the assumption that they act based 
on a budget-maximizing model in a self-interested way for the purpose of enhancing their own 
power and influence. The theory aims to apply economic analysis (usually decision theory and 
game theory) to the political decision-making process in order to reveal certain systematic 
trends towards inefficient government policies. The next studies should use these theories to 
provide a clearer picture about the motives of the government in implementing and continuing 
the energy subsidy reform in Iran.  
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Appendix 1: 
Subsidy Reform Law 
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Article 1. The government is required to reform the prices of energy carriers in accordance 
with the provisions of this law:1 2 3 4 
 Domestic sale prices of energy carriers: gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, kerosene, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG), and other oil condensates, inclusive of relevant costs (including 
transport and distribution expenses, taxes, and other legal duties) and depending on the 
quality of carriers, will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 5 th Five-Year 
Development Plan (FYDP) 2010-15, up to a level which shall not be less than 90 percent 
of Persian Gulf FOB prices.5 
 Average domestic sale price of natural gas will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 5 
th FYDP up to a level which shall not be less than 75 percent of average export price of 
natural gas, excluding transfer costs, taxes and legal duties.6 
 Average domestic sale price of electricity will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 5 
th FYDP up to a level which shall be equal to full cost price.7 
Article 2. To manage the impact of energy carriers price fluctuations on the domestic 
economy, the government is authorized to keep the prices unchanged for consumers as long as 
Persian Gulf FOB prices fluctuate within a range of 25 percent, by paying subsidy or 
collecting differentials, as the case may be, and include such amounts in the account 
established for regulating energy carriers market, in the relevant annual budget. If price 
fluctuations exceed the said 25 percent range, prices will be adjusted accordingly. 
Article 3. The government is authorized to adjust the price of water and the fee chargeable for 
sewage collection and disposal, in accordance with the provisions of this law. 
131 
 
 Average price of water for different uses will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 5 th 
FYDP, up to a level which shall be equal to the cost price, considering the quality and the 
manner of purification. 8 9 
 Calculation of chargeable fee for sewage collection and disposal services will be based on 
total costs of maintenance and operation of the sewage system, after deduction of the 
intrinsic value of delivered wastewater and government aids under the annual budget (in 
connection with incentive policies). 
Article 4. The government is required to make arrangements for gradual targeting of subsidies 
payable on wheat, rice, cooking oil, milk, sugar, postal services, and air and rail (passenger) 
transportation services, until the end of the 5th FYDP.10 
Article 5. The government is required to make available the flour and bread subsidies to 
consumers, who have applied, to the extent payable in accordance with the annual budget bill, 
through appropriate methods. 11 
Article 6. The government is required to adopt incentive and supportive policies, which are 
necessary to establish and expand industrial bread production units, and also to help 
compensate the losses to the flour and bread production units that may face difficulties as a 
result of implementing this law. The implementing regulations of this Article will be prepared 
by the Ministry of Commerce, in cooperation with relevant organizations, and approved by the 
Cabinet within three months after the approval of this law. 
Article 7. The government is authorized to spend up to 50 percent of net proceeds resulting 
from the implementation of this law under the following items: 
 Cash and non-cash subsidies payable to all households countrywide, considering the level 
of household income; 
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 Implementing a comprehensive social security system for the targeted population, such as: 
(i) Providing and expanding social insurances, health care services, ensuring and 
enhancing public health, and medical coverage for special and difficult-to-cure diseases; 
(ii) Providing assistance for financing housing costs, enhancing resistance of buildings, 
and creating employment; (iii) Empowering and implementing social support programs. 12 
13 
Article 8. The government is required to spend 30 percent of the net proceeds resulting from 
the implementation of this law to pay for grants, or subsidies on bank facility charges, or 
specially managed funds for implementation of the following items: 14 
 Optimizing energy consumption in production, services, and residential units, and 
encouraging energy savings and observing the consumption pattern introduced by the 
relevant implementing organization. 
 Reforming technological structures of production plants, aimed at increasing efficiency of 
energy and water, and developing electricity generation from renewable resources. 
Compensating part of losses to the companies providing utility services–water and 
sewage, electricity, and natural gas—and oil products, and municipalities and townships, 
incurred as a result of implementing this law.  
 Developing and improving public transportation, under the framework of Public 
Transportation Development and Fuel Consumption Management Law, and paying an 
amount up to the credit ceiling determined under Article (9) of the said law. 
 Supporting the producers in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
 Supporting production of industrial bread. 
 Supporting non-oil export promotion. 
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 Developing interactive electronic services to eliminate or reduce need for unnecessary 
traffic. 
Article 9. Sources discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of this law, including aid, facilities, 
and specially-managed funds, will be made available to the said persons through state-owned 
and private bank and non-bank financial institutions. 
Article 10. Receipt of aids and subsidies discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of this law will 
be subject to providing accurate information. If the provided information proves to be 
inaccurate, the government is required to take necessary legal actions for refunding the 
amounts so paid, while preventing future payments. If the persons consider that they are 
eligible for receipt of the aids and subsidies discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of this law, 
they may submit their objection to the Commission that shall be foreseen under the 
implementing regulations of this Article The implementing regulations of this Article will be 
proposed by Ministers of Justice, Economic Affairs and Finance, Welfare and Social Security, 
and Head of MPO, and approved by the Cabinet within three months after the notification of 
this law. 
Article 11. The government is authorized to spend up to 20 percent of the net proceeds 
resulting from the implementation of this law, to compensate its impact on spending and the 
acquisition of capital assets. 
Article 12. The government is required to deposit all income sources resulting from 
implementation of this law into a special account titled subsidy targeting account with the 
General Treasury. 100 percent of funds so deposited will be allocated for the uses authorized 
under Articles (7), (8) and (11) of this law, and under the framework of annual budget laws. 15 
16 17 
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Article 13. The petty cash needed to implement this law will be included in the petty cash of 
the annual budget, and will be settled from sources generated by implementation of this law 
during the year. 18 
Article 14. The interchangeability of credits discussed in Articles (7), (8) and (11) of this law 
will be authorized only for a maximum of 10 percentage point in the annual budget, so that the 
total proceeds so resulted shall be used as provided in this law. 
Article 15. The Government is authorized to establish, within one month after coming into 
force of this law, a new organization of public company nature named Subsidy Targeting 
Organization (the Organization) for implementation of this law in accordance with the FYDP 
Law, by using the available resources (facilities, manpower and credits) or by restructuring 
and merging the existing companies. The government is authorized to draw whenever needed 
the funds deposited to the Treasury as a result of implementation of this law, and make such 
amounts available to the Organization as aid, after deduction of the government's share as per 
Article (11) hereof, which amounts will be utilized solely for purposes and obligations 
specified in Articles (7) and (8) of this law. The Organization‘s administration will be 
centralized, and it will be authorized to have only staff, planning, and supervising units in the 
centre. The members of its General Assembly will comprise Ministers of Welfare and Social 
Security, Economic Affairs and Finance, Commerce, Roads and Transportation, Agricultural 
Jihad, Industries and Mines, Petroleum, Energy, and Head of MPO. The company‘s 
Organization‘s articles of association, including its pillars, responsibilities and powers, will be 
prepared by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and MPO, and approved by the 
Ministerial Cabinet. Funds and credits discussed in this law, including in Articles (12) and (15), 
will be reflected in the country‘s general budget, like those of other public companies, and 
changes in the company's Organization‘s credit ceilings during the year will be subject to 
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providing a proposal by the government and its approved by Parliament, except for the cases 
authorized in accordance with provisions of this law, including Articles (2) and (14). The 
Organization‘s unutilized funds in any year could be used in the succeeding year, and in any 
year it may make commitments for the succeeding years under the framework of this law. 
Credits governed by this law are subject to the Regulations Governing Spending Credits 
Exempted from Observance of the Public Audit Law and Other General Government 
Regulations Law approved on 06/11/1364 (January 26, 1986). The Organization is required to 
provide reports on performance, receipts and payments related to resources from subsidy 
targeting, for each of Articles (7) and (8) separately, at the end of each six-month period, to 
Parliament‘s Planning, Budget and Audit Committee and other relevant committees. The 
Supreme Audit Court is required to provide semi-annual reports to Parliament on the 
Organizations‘ operations based on the contemplated targets as provided in this law. 
Article 16. Starting from the beginning of the year 1389 (March 21, 2010), the government is 
authorized to increase the tax exemption level provided under Article (84) of the Direct Taxes 
Law, proportional to price adjustments under this law and in addition to its annual increase, 
subject to Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance‘s proposal, over a period of five years 
and up to a maximum of 100 percent.  
The above law, consisting of 16 Articles and 16 Notes, was approved by the Islamic Assembly 
on Tuesday, 15 Day 1388 (January 5, 2010) and was confirmed by the Guardian Council on 
23 Day 1388 (January 13, 2010). 
1- http://www.icana.ir/News/Parliament/2010/1/52183/0/Default.aspx. 
2-With regard to electricity and natural gas prices, the government is authorized to apply preferential prices, 
considering geographical regions, type, amount, and time of consumption. In cases where several families or 
subscribers share the benefits of a single subscription, Water, Electricity, and Gas Companies are required to 
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install additional individual meters for additional families by charging only the cost of meter and its installation 
expenses; and in case it shall not be possible to install additional individual meters, the number of subscribers 
shall be increased to the number of individual users of the shared subscription. 
3- Calculation of prices of energy carriers after the first year of implementation of this law will be based on the 
exchange rate used in the relevant annual budget. 
4- The adjustment of relevant prices in the first year of implementation of this law will be made in a manner that 
generate an additional aggregate amount of revenue up to RLS 200,000 billion, but not less than RLS 100,000 
billion. 
5- Sale prices of crude oil and gas liquids to domestic refineries will be equal to 95 percent of Persian Gulf FOB 
prices, and purchase prices of products from the refineries will be set in line with the said prices. 
6- To encourage investment, for a period of at least 10 years from the date of approval of this law, the prices of 
feedstock for industrial, refinery, and petrochemical plants per cubic meter, will not exceed a level which is equal 
to 65 percent of a basket of gas export prices of Persian Gulf origin (excluding transfer costs). 
7- Calculation of electricity cost price will be based on total costs of energy conversion, transmission and 
distribution, and fuel costs, with an efficiency of at least 38 percent of power plants and observance of standards; 
and the efficiency of the country‘s power plants shall be improved by at least 1 percent per year, so that it reach a 
level of 45 percent within 5 years from the date of implementation of this law, and also 2 the transmission and 
distribution power grid losses to be reduced to 14 percent by the end of the 5th FYDP. The government is 
required to make arrangements for rating of electricity producers in terms of efficiency and its distributers in 
terms of energy losses by establishing a work group comprising governmental and nongovernmental experts, and 
to adopt appropriate incentives and supportive policies. 
8- The government is required to set the cost price of water by including all costs of water supply, transfer and 
distribution, and observing efficiency. 
9- Setting preferential and multiple prices for different uses of water, in view of geographical regions, type, and 
amount of consumption, will be authorized. 
10- Subsidies paid to producers in agriculture sector in each year should not be less than the same for the 
preceding year. 
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11- Per capita bread subsidy payable to population of villages and the cities with less than twenty thousand 
people, and vulnerable groups in other cities, will be at least 50 percent more than the average per capita subsidy, 
at the discretion of the government.  
12- The implementing regulations of this Article, including how to identify the targeted population, and establish 
and update the needed databases; the method of payment to the targeted population; and the payments under this 
Article, will be proposed by Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance, and Welfare and Social Security, and 
Head of Management and Planning Organization (MPO), and approved by the Cabinet, within three months after 
the approval of this law. 
13- The government can open the subsidy targeting account in the name of the head of each eligible family, or 
another eligible person determined by the government. The government is authorized to exercise control over the 
manner in which the funds are spent under the said account, including the applicable time, type of drawings, and 
the refund of amounts that have erroneously been deposited. 
14- The implementing regulations of this Article, including the method of supporting industries, agriculture, and 
services, and the manner of payments under this Article, will be proposed by Ministers of Economic Affairs and 
Finance, Industries and Mines, Agricultural Jihad, Commerce, Petroleum, Energy, and Interior, Chairman of the 
Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines, the Secretary General of the Chamber of Cooperatives, and 
Head of MPO, and approved by the Cabinet within three months after the approval of this law. 
15- The government is required to present credits amounts of sources and uses discussed under the said Articles 
in four separate items in the relevant annual budget bill. 
16- Cash and noncash aids provided to natural and legal persons as a result of implementation of this law will be 
exempt from income tax under the Direct Taxes Law 6 approved in Esfand 1366 (February 1988) as amended. 
Such aids to such persons for compensation in part or in whole of the price of goods or services provided by them 
will not be subject to the tax exemption provided under this note. 
17 - The government is required to provide the Supreme Audit Court and Parliament with the detailed report of 
operations under this Article every six month. 
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